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ORIGINALISM’S EXPIRATION DATE
Adam M. Samaha*
The Constitution of the United States declares itself supreme law,
but even the amended document is ancient. By 2008, the predicted
age of a randomly selected word in this text reached 178 years. The
judiciary, for its part, might not interpret the text until decades after
ratification. For Article V amendments, the average lag between
ratification and Supreme Court interpretation has been about 40
years. The question is how these features of our supreme law might
influence the choice of interpretive method and, ultimately,
constitutional decisionmaking. In particular, some scholars indicate
that originalism may be a strong force in adjudication when
constitutional text is still fresh, but should then fade with time.
This Article is a reassessment of time’s influence on
constitutional adjudication. It begins by investigating the character
and suggesting the causes of time lags in the interpretation of
supreme law. It also identifies the Supreme Court’s initial encounters
with Article V amendments and charts some interpretive trends over
time. The Article then turns to the normative arguments for an
expiring originalism. First, it resists the claim that strong judicial
originalism is always desirable in the wake of ratification. Second, it
pushes back in the other direction and explores justifications for a
timeless originalism. An example is the possibility that judicial
originalism generates ex ante incentives for Article V effort. Although
unacceptable to some on principle, for others this justification will be
persuasive on certain empirical assumptions. Finally, an unorthodox
analogy is explored. Within a limited domain, a version of originalism
can function as a culturally acceptable substitute for randomization.
It turns out that a corner of supreme law is likely best determined at
random, even if judges will never actually roll dice.
* Assistant Professor, The University of Chicago Law School; Visiting Professor,
Stanford Law School. For helpful comments and discussions, I thank David Abrams, Douglas
Baird, Adam Cox, Richard Epstein, Dan Farber, Jake Gersen, Tom Ginsburg, Alison LaCroix,
Daniel Levine, Saul Levmore, Anup Malani, Richard McAdams, Ariel Porat, Eric Posner, Mike
Seidman, Larry Solum, Geof Stone, Lior Strahilevitz, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein, Andreas
Thier and workshop participants at the Georgetown University Law Center and the
University of Chicago Law School. I also thank Richard Primus for sharing early drafts of his
work in this area. Aditi Paranjpye and Emma Ruby‐Sachs provided outstanding research
assistance. Mistakes are mine.
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He confessed that he trembled at the idea of altering it, though
he was attached to that part of it which gave the right of altering it.†
Let the die be cast.††
INTRODUCTION
Among the more bizarre provisions in the Constitution of the
United States is the procedure for its formal amendment.1 Article V
describes a series of supermajority votes before new text becomes
supreme law under Article VI. Ordinary constitutions — whether
11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1286 (1802) (reporting remarks of Rep. Benjamin Huger) (discussing
the Constitution during the debate on whether to add a Twelfth Amendment).
†† 5 PLUTARCH’S LIVES 273 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., 1914) (attributed to Julius Caesar).
There is more than one version of this quotation. See infra notes 157–159.
1 I mean the document ratified in 1789 and amended via Article V, not more functional
definitions of supreme or constitutional law. I often refer to it as “the document.”
†

SAMAHA_EXPIRATION_SSRN (2).DOC

2008]

11/13/2008 3:29 PM

ORIGINALISM’S EXPIRATION DATE

103

national, state, or local — do not imitate this design. Article V is an
outlier. And little used during the 219 years since the first version
of the document was ratified. By 2008, the predicted age of a
randomly selected word in this text reached 178 years.2 A long
temporal distance between ratification and interpretation of such
text is therefore the norm. This is the interpretation lag, and it is a
persistent feature of our constitutional system.
There is a second time lag worth understanding. It involves
adjudication. Decades can pass before the Supreme Court first
interprets constitutional text. While other commentators have
indicated that the judiciary’s influence on all policy is seriously
limited,3 the Court is not the leading voice on the Constitution’s
meaning, either. This would be less important if courts interpreted
constitutional text either early or never.4 But courts may try to
interpret late. Between 1791 and 2008, the average lag between an
amendment’s ratification and its first interpretation by the Court
was approximately 40 years.5 This is the adjudication lag, and it
varies tremendously across amendments.
The interpretation and adjudication lags are realities. The
question is whether they ought to influence how we treat
constitutional text today. For instance, when the Supreme Court
adjudicated rights to possess handguns6 and petition for habeas
corpus7 last Term, should it have mattered that relevant
constitutional text was more than 200 years old? Should the Court
have been adjudicating First Amendment claims differently?8 Was a
different approach to these texts required in 1791? What is the
appropriate relationship between the passage of time and the
rendering of supreme law?
2 See infra Part I.A & fig.2.
3 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 123, 251 (1994) (noting that courts can address only a

LAW,
small
fraction of significant policy disputes); cf. Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda
— and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9, 49 (2006) (arguing that most Supreme Court
adjudication deals with non‐salient, even if sometimes influential, policies).
4 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 400–07 (1985) (observing
that many clauses are rarely or never litigated, and pointing to relative clarity as a reason).
5 See infra Part I.B & fig.3. The test for Supreme Court “interpretation” used in this
calculation is lax. See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
6 See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. ___, ____,128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788–2812, 2816–18,
2821–22 (2008) (recognizing a limited right to handgun possession in the home under the
Second Amendment, and relying on eighteenth‐ and nineteenth‐century history).
7 See Boumediene v. Bush, 554 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2245–51 (2008) (exploring
English and United States history forerunning the Habeas Clause, albeit without finding
specific guidance).
8 See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 554 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770–74 (2008)
(invalidating a rollback of campaign contribution limits, with reference to case law and not
originalist history).
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There are several possible answers. One option is to disregard
the document. Perhaps a sufficiently long lapse after ratification
destroys any justification for abiding by the Constitution. No official
would openly advocate this position today, but certain practices
might only be understood as departures from the document’s
meaning to serve felt needs. At the other extreme is the option of
ignoring time lags. Perhaps the document should have the same
legal force today as it did in 1789 and be interpreted in precisely
the same way. Strong forms of originalism suggest this result. They
counsel the preservation of textual meaning using the same
interpretive method across generations.9 Alternatively, it is
possible to take an intermediate position on the proper effect of
time lags. A decision‐maker might treat the document as less
influential or subject to different interpretive techniques as time
passes, and yet still deserving of some consideration even after two
centuries. There is no shortage of options.
Debate over judicial originalism is, to a degree, already shaped
by the brute facts of interpretation and adjudication lags. Skeptics
of history’s use in adjudication might concede that originalism is
justifiable when ratification is a recent memory, but hold that
originalism has an expiration date.10 Originalists are sensitive to
9 See infra Part III.A (noting versions of originalism). Some theorists claim that
“interpretation” of a legal text for the purpose of understanding its meaning simply is the
discovery of authorial intent or of public meaning at the time of adoption. See infra notes
114, 183–184. I use a looser definition of interpretation that captures a wider range of
contemporary usage. See infra text accompanying notes 113–114. This is not to take sides
in a conceptual or definitional debate, however. The Article speaks to those with narrow
definitions of interpretation as well: At some point, theorists must deal with the potential
influence of time on constitutional decision‐making, whether that point is “interpretation”
or not. My general concern is sound decision‐making, not interpretation per se. See infra
Part III.A; see also Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 633–34, 675–77 (2008) (discussing interpretation, information, and
decision).
10 See Richard Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 109 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 44–47) (arguing that originalism can satisfy a
democratic objective only shortly after enactment); infra note 155 (discussing Primus). For
earlier work reaching similar conclusions, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 205, 229 & n.94 (1980) (referring to a form of
non‐originalism in which the presumptive force of text and history is “defeasible over time
in the light of changing experiences and perceptions”); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating
Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J.
1765, 1815–20 (1997) (arguing that, even when a court faces a paradigm case that inspired
an amendment, “the strength of originalist arguments diminishes over time”); Thomas W.
Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509, 512 (1996) (recommending
contemporary conventional meaning over original meaning when they diverge over time);
David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717,
1752–54 (2003) (arguing that it may be appropriate to start with originalist interpretation
but to employ other methods as time passes); cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 375 (1981) (“[I]t would be an intuitive, widely shared
premise that the supreme court in 1800 should have accorded interpretive primacy to
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these arguments. Their preferred method continues to evolve in its
specific protocol and in its justifications. But neither the criticism
nor the defense of originalism is fully organized around temporal
issues. Time is the central focus of this Article’s investigation into
supreme law. It offers two contributions.
First, the Article presents measures and explanations for
interpretation and adjudication lags in supreme law. Clearly the
Constitution is aging and often the Court is an interpretation‐
laggard. But we do not always know why. Recognizing this
uncertainty is pertinent to the normative choices surrounding
interpretation and adjudication.11 Past practice, moreover, can
illuminate feasible options. The Article therefore identifies the
Supreme Court’s initial attempts to understand constitutional
amendments and then characterizes some doctrinal trends
thereafter. The basic finding is variety. Sometimes the Court uses
non‐originalist arguments to justify case outcomes shortly after
ratification, and sometimes it emphasizes originalist history long
after ratification. There is no obvious pattern, and no easily
discerned feasibility constraint on judicial methodology.
Second, the Article renovates arguments over strong forms of
originalism to concentrate on time lags. Of the methodological
alternatives, originalism might be the most sensitive to time lags,
and it quickly becomes apparent that most criticism of originalism
depends on substantial distance from ratification. Consider the
objection that following ancient judgments defeats today’s
democratic will or that historical investigation becomes more
difficult as time passes. True, certain objections to making
decisions on originalist grounds can be pushed still further, and I
will suggest that originalist decision‐making is sometimes
inappropriate even in the wake of ratification. Regardless,
originalist decision‐making would be most powerfully defended on
justifications that are insensitive to time lags. But often no such
defense is possible. Several popular arguments for originalism do
run headlong into time‐related objections or, if they do not, they are
problematic for other reasons.
The closing sections of the Article experiment with other
justifications for a strong judicial originalism that lasts. I spotlight
two. One argument is comfortably logical, albeit largely overlooked,
while the other is unorthodox. The first justification involves ex
ante incentives. The supposition is that future law reformers might
original intent.”); Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033,
1063 (1980) (“The original meaning of the document is not abandoned at a single moment,
but gradually.”).
11 See infra Part IV.D.1 (discussing possible incentives for Article V lawmaking).
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favor the politics of amendment‐making over litigation if the
judiciary starts holding to a strong form of originalism. This
justification is hobbled by empirical uncertainties, but it should be
attractive in principle to some. The alternative justification
involves randomization. Within a limited domain of issues, perhaps
a version of originalism can be defended as a culturally acceptable
substitute for settling disputes by random selection. If refashioned
into a quick take on history, originalism can amount to throwing
dice on supreme law. Applying history to contemporary disputes
can be somewhat arbitrary, yet a kind of arbitrariness is perfectly
rational in some decision situations. This revision of originalism
has a limited scope and major weaknesses. But my goal is to
explore the possibilities for originalist inquiry in constitutional
adjudication, whether or not the arguments track the commitments
of today’s originalist movement.
Part I of the Article is a diagnosis. It introduces the
interpretation and adjudication lags, along with thoughts on their
dynamics. Included is a weighted average age for the Constitution
and a measure of the adjudication lag for Article V amendments.
Part II is analytical. It charts possible and plausible trajectories for
originalism’s strength in constitutional decision‐making over time.
It then identifies the Court’s first encounters with Article V
amendments, characterizes the variety of reasoning on display, and
briefly reviews trends thereafter in several doctrinal fields. Parts III
and IV are normative. They discuss time‐oriented critiques of
originalism, defend historiography against the threats of age, and
then develop pro‐history arguments least likely to degrade with
time. I close by exploring justifications founded on incentives and
randomization, as well as the premises on which they depend.
I. TIME LAGS IN SUPREME LAW
Insofar as one wants to enforce the Constitution of the United
States, time lags become hardwired into supreme law. This is true
in two senses. First, there always will be a growing temporal gap
between ratification of a particular word string and its
interpretation. Interpretation lags are unavoidable and affect all
interpreters, but the underlying reasons for the length of these gaps
are not so clear. Second, there often will be a substantial temporal
gap between ratification and a judge’s first attempt to understand
ratified text. Different decision‐makers enter the interpretive scene
at different moments. For the Supreme Court, the timing of its
entrance has varied greatly across different bits of constitutional
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text, but a multi‐decade delay is typical. I explain the basis for these
observations in this Part.
A.

The Interpretation Lag and Its Dynamics

The Constitution’s words are aging. Instead of a continuous
process of textual updating, Article V amendments are often
relatively narrow interventions and they usually arrive with
significant delays between them (Figure 1). There have been only
six recognized Article V amendments since Franklin Roosevelt’s
first term as President. Although 40% of the document’s words
were added after 1789, not much more than 25% of those additions
occurred after 1933. The words ratified in 1789 were 219 years old
in 2008, which is not dramatically higher than the predicted age of a
randomly selected word in the amended document: 178 years old.
At times, enough text has been added to seriously alter the rate of
increase. But the document’s weighted average age has been
increasing fairly steadily since 1789 (Figure 2).12

12 The weighted average age of the document is the sum of the ages of each part of the
text, adjusted according to the fraction of the total text that each part represents in a given
year. For example, the weighted average age of the document in 1795 was (6 years of age
for the original Constitution * (4,379 words in the original Constitution ⁄ 4,861 total words
in 1795)) + (4 years of age for the Bill of Rights * (482 words in the Bill of Rights ⁄ 4,861
total words in 1795)) = 5.8 years. A longer note on methodology is available from the
author on request.
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Figure 1: Additions to the Constitution of the United States, in Words
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The upshot is that anyone interpreting the document is most
likely adverting to text enacted generations earlier. This point is
generally understood, but the reasons for an aging constitutional
text are not settled. The immediate causes are, of course, retention
of the document as law coupled with a low Article V amendment
rate and the absence of large‐scale revision through that process.
The debatable question is why, exactly, the use of Article V has been
rare and modest. A growing empirical literature attempts to
answer such causation questions.13 But the answers are not
conclusive and the simplest explanations are not plainly best.
One might begin by supposing that the Article V amendment
rate is a function of (1) status quo satisfaction levels, (2) the formal
rules for amendment and (3) the alternatives for achieving the
same or similar outcomes, including new understandings of existing
text.
With high satisfaction levels, extremely demanding
amendment rules, and functional alternatives to address any
remaining complaints with the legal status quo, one should expect
few or no formal amendments. At the opposite extremes, one might
predict repeated or extensive amendments revising nearly every
element of supreme law. Other combinations suggest additional
possibilities: low satisfaction levels along with demanding
amendment rules and no functional alternatives might lead people
to simply disregard the document. But the pattern under
consideration here is the limited use of Article V despite continued
public respect for the document.
Genuine popular satisfaction is not a complete explanation for
the Article V amendment rate. We can expect satisfaction to
fluctuate, and there is no guarantee that low satisfaction yields
amendments. Periods of rather intense demand for law reform
have not always been reflected in amendments: the political
victories of Jacksonian Democracy, the New Deal, the Civil Rights
Movement, and the Nixon and Reagan coalitions are possible
illustrations.14 Further, the document has become a national icon,15
13 The seminal work is Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237,
254–62 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (finding that shorter constitutions and higher
estimated difficultly of the amendment process are correlated with falling amendment
rates); see also John Ferejohn, The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of Constitutions,
22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 501, 523 (1997) (concluding that the key variable in amendment
rates is special legislative voting requirements, not public referenda or state‐level
ratification); Bjørn E. Rasch & Roger D. Congleton, Amendment Procedures and
Constitutional Stability, in DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND PUBLIC POLICY: ANALYSIS
AND EVIDENCE 319, 333–35 (Roger D. Congleton & Birgitta Swedenborg eds., 2006) (studying
OECD countries and concluding, in contrast, that “multiple decisions with voter
involvement” tend to decrease amendment rates rather than special legislative majorities).
14 See generally Bruce Ackerman, 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Living
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which can strangely dampen the use of its own Article V process.
We can find at least one likely case of Article V allergy. As
congressional debate over a twelfth amendment began in 1802,
Federalist Representative Benjamin Huger reportedly “trembled at
the idea of altering [the Constitution], though he was attached to
that part of it which gave the right of altering it.”16 This kind of
reverence might signify elements of path dependence as well.
Maintaining an institution can be judged superior to the risks and
costs of transformation, even if the institution is suboptimal in
retrospect.17 Still, the existence of formal amendments suggests
textual changes are not anathema.
As to formal amendment rules, the veto gates described in
Article V are indeed extraordinary. On its face, the Article V process
is more difficult than the legislative process described in Article I,
Section 7, and it might seem as or more demanding than any
constitution in the world.18 The required supermajorities indicate
especially high decision costs to achieve enactment, with the
possibility of a few members of Congress or state legislators holding
out for handsome payoffs.
Additional factors must be considered, however. A procedure
might appear onerous without resulting in a low amendment rate
or serious holdout problems. An amendment might be considered
more durable and worth more effort than ordinary legislation. This
could increase amendment attempts as the formal rules become
more taxing. But of course this depends on the time horizon for law
reform efforts. Participants might not care enough about the
distant future for durable Article V victories to be prized. In
Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1749–50 (2007) (arguing that the document does not
reflect modern nationalistic values).
15 See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF 3 (1986); cf. Max Lerner,
Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1294, 1298 (1937) (going so far as to
associate certain cultural use of the Constitution with totem, fetish, and cult).
16 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1286 (1802); cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 313, 314 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (hoping for veneration of government through
stability).
17 See PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 10–24
(2004); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, LockIn, and History, 11 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 205, 206–08 (1995) (categorizing claims that an initial decision was
suboptimal based on whether or not a better choice was feasibly recognizable).
18 See generally Lutz, supra note 13, at 256–61 & tbl. 11 (comparing 30 national
constitutions and finding the U.S Constitution second‐most difficult to amend, based on an
index of indicators assembled from U.S. state experience); Janice C. May, State Constitutional
Developments in 2003, in 36 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 3, 6 tbl.B (2004) (explaining the
processes for amending U.S. state constitutions). Perhaps the addition of state legislatures
and members of Congress over time has made Article V more difficult to use in 2008
compared to 1789. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 112 (1962) (theorizing a rise in per
capita bargaining costs under the same voting rule as decision‐makers increase).
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addition, there is empirical work indicating that the length of a
constitution or the surrounding political climate, such as one‐party
dominance, are more important factors in the amendment rate than
The United States has rarely
the formalities of process.19
experienced partisan political dominance across national and state
institutions, and the Constitution is a relatively concise document
with significant generalities.
Another possible factor is the availability of alternatives. Other
avenues for change might be roughly as good as, and easier to
accomplish than, Article V lawmaking under present circumstances.
It is worth emphasizing that alternatives can reduce the demand for
formal amendments whether or not Article V lawmaking is highly
valued. Perhaps altering constitutional text does achieve the
deepest available victory; the document’s advertisement of
“supreme” law in Article VI suggests as much. Yet we know enough
about written constitutions to understand that new paper does not
necessarily mean new practices or lasting social change. The
decades after Reconstruction are evidence of this. There must be
living human will to make legal texts relevant, and those who want
change for the long run will not necessarily prefer Article V
amendments to so‐called ordinary law joined with a political
coalition to keep it stable.
Thus alternatives to formal
constitutional amendment might be attractive because they achieve
adequately significant change, or because Article V cannot be
depended upon to do so.20
But uncertainty surrounds the magnitude of this influence as
well. There is reason to deny that Article V has been effectively
duplicated. Different routes to change have different features and
they present different opportunities for reversal. Supreme Court
interpretations of the Constitution are styled as final renderings of
supreme law reversible by Article V amendment, but they also can
be reversed by a subsequent Court decision.21 They are thus
vulnerable to personnel changes, if nothing else.22 The text of the
19 See Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, American Civil Law Origins: Implications for State
Constitutions, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 62, 64, 74–75 (2005) (downplaying formal amendment
rules after accounting for partisan political competition, then stressing a statistically
significant link from a state’s civil law tradition to a relatively high amendment rate); Lutz,
supra note 13, at 247 (correlating document length with amendment rate); see also
Ferejohn, supra note 13, at 524 (critiquing emphasis on formal amendment rules).
20 See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1457, 1458–64 (2001) (arguing Article V amendments have been neither necessary nor
sufficient for serious change).
21 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235–36 (1997) (recognizing the possibility of
Article V override and reiterating that stare decisis is softer in constitutional adjudication).
22 See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS 3 (5th ed. 2008) (discussing
ideological compatibility in the nomination decision); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Variable Voting
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Constitution cannot be formally altered by Court decision. Of
course, constitutional text may be misunderstood or misused by the
judiciary, and courts might nevertheless receive respect when they
declare constitutional meaning. Still, constitutional text can have
influence beyond the courtroom. It might affect arguments and
behavior even if, for purposes of litigation, courts sometimes have
the power to ignore its meaning.23 Of similar importance are the
sociopolitical consequences associated with each method of change.
Using the formal amendment process implicates a distinct set of
actors and actions, and one should expect different effects on the
political environment. Even if adjudication can produce similar
effects on politics, which is doubtful,24 and even if Article V
movements influence judicial understanding of the Constitution,
which is almost certainly true on occasion,25 it would be a mistake
to equate two paths.
The difference, however, is a matter of degree. Ordinary
legislation, regulation, private ordering and litigation may be
acceptable in light of Article V’s procedural hurdles and
weaknesses. To be clear, some of these alternatives do not purport
to generate supreme law. Change advocates may accept this and
settle for something less than nominally supreme federal law when
they can do so consistently with the document as interpreted. For
instance, those who want states to license cross‐sex and not same‐
sex marriage might prefer a federal constitutional amendment to
that effect, yet satisfy themselves with changes in state
constitutional law.26 This migration away from supreme law is
Behavior on the Supreme Court: A Preliminary Analysis and Research Framework, 25 JUST. SYS.
J. 57, 62 (2004) (indicating that, in cases where precedent was explicitly overruled, justices
were most likely to stick with their initial position, but emphasizing that 30% of the studied
votes were to overrule precedent that the justice in question had helped set).
23 See generally KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 2 (1999) (“Not everything that courts do is consistent with the
ideal of interpretation. Not everything that elaborates constitutional meaning is
interpretation.”).
24 See Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan, When the Supreme Court Decides, Does the Public
Follow? 2–3 (July 5, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=998597
(using survey research and finding no effect or a small effect on public opinion from
learning about the Court’s resistance to regulation of abortion, flagburning, and sodomy);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1830 (2005)
(collecting studies finding little influence on public opinion).
25 See Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2602
(2003); Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003) (“[C]onstitutional law and culture are locked in a
dialectical relationship . . . .”); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution
from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 302 (2001).
26 Cf. Lynn D. Wardle, The Proposed Federal Marriage Amendment and the Risks to
Federalism in Family Law, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 137, 197–98 (2004) (describing the movement
for state‐level cross‐sex marriage amendments, but ultimately supporting a federal
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surely real and interesting, but perhaps less controversial than
other movements.
Another effort triggers complaints of constitutional perversion:
when change advocates seek reform without using Article V and
their objective is inconsistent with the document as understood by
some set of interpreters. Few advocates will concede that their
goals contradict the document as properly interpreted, and proving
otherwise depends on the contested notion of “interpretation.”27
Usually they will claim, as Franklin Roosevelt did, that resisters
misunderstand the Constitution.28 But sometimes those claims will
be fairly disputed and a reform movement will nonetheless channel
resources away from Article V.29
Among the more controversial of these workarounds is judicial
updating. Change advocates might turn to the courts for what
amounts to a revision of supreme law. This can have more than one
effect on other forums. A possibility is that litigation ultimately
energizes non‐judicial political action. Successful litigation might
clear the way for politics by other means, as when the Supreme
Court was urged to modify its understanding of congressional
authority during the New Deal.30 Or it could be part of a campaign
to trump politics‐as‐usual, as when the Court was asked to
repudiate racial segregation in public schools.31 Either way,
litigation can be a rough substitute for supreme lawmaking through
Article V — not a categorically lower‐order alternative that is
accepted by all as reversible through ordinary lawmaking.
As well, such litigation could reduce the expected value of
Article V amendments. Those amendments might be subject to
creative reinterpretation in the future to serve new interests. To
amendment to stop “judicial activism” and “lawlessness”).
27 See Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution Been
Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in
RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 13, at 13, 25–36; infra Part III.A.
28 See Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the Judiciary (Mar.
9, 1937), available at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/030937.html (“We must find a way
to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the Constitution itself.”).
29 Roosevelt considered an Article V effort, but decided against it. See William E.
Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘CourtPacking’ Plan, 1966 SUP. CT. REV.
347, 362–65, 384–86 (noting, inter alia, drafting difficulties, delay, expected opposition
from business interests and lawyers, and judicial interpretation thereafter); see also 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 20–25 (1998) (describing non‐Article V
constitutional moments involving national political confrontations); LARRY KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW ch. 1 (2004)
(examining a tradition of popular influence on constitutional meaning).
30 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124–25 (1942) (testing federal regulation
by the purportedly substantial effect of its subject on interstate commerce).
31 See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (relying on the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause to oppose racial segregation in D.C. public schools).
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the extent change advocates have lengthy time horizons, the formal
amendment rate could spiral downward.
The relationship between judicial review and amendment rates
is an empirical question with implications for choosing an
interpretive method.32 Yet our understanding of the relationship is
notably unsophisticated. Educated guesswork might suggest an
inverse relationship, something to “take on faith” for the time being,
but conventional wisdom is vulnerable to sustained investigation.33
It could be that the amendment rate would be equally low if no
substantially similar alternatives to Article V existed. It is also
possible that Article V alternatives prevented the need for, and risks
of, a full‐blown rewriting of the Constitution. Perhaps the most that
can be said with confidence is that several factors — adequate
satisfaction with supreme law allied with the document’s status as a
national icon, the practical difficulty in surviving the amendment
process in ordinary times given the political environment, and the
feasible alternatives including judicial interpretation — probably
work together to depress the modern Article V amendment rate.
B.

The Adjudication Lag and Its Dynamics

The adjudication lag is different. It directs attention to one
audience for the document: judges resolving disputes.
The
adjudication lag measures the time between ratification of
constitutional text and the use of that text by courts. There might not
be anything independently interesting about it if courts were always
interpreting constitutional text alongside other decision-makers. But
they do not. Judges are interpretation laggards.
Accurately measuring the adjudication lag for all clauses in the
document and for all courts in the United States would be
burdensome. Existing search engines cannot be relied on to find the
first instance of judicial “interpretation” without additional human
judgment. Nevertheless, we can make meaningful progress by
studying only Article V amendments and only Supreme Court
opinions.

32
33

See infra Part IV.D.1 (discussing incentives‐based justifications for originalism).
Ferejohn, supra note 13, at 525.
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Figure 3: Variance in the Adjudication Lag
for Amendments at the Supreme Court, in Years
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2nd (keep & bear arms)
20th (federal terms)*
8th (punishment & fines)
6th (criminal trial clauses)
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10th (reserved powers)

5th (due process etc.)

22nd (term limits)

25th (presidential succession etc.)
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* The Twentieth, Twenty‐Third, and Twenty‐Seventh Amendments have not yet
been interpreted by the Supreme Court as of 2008. The calculation of a 42 year
average treats these three Amendments as if they had been interpreted in 2008.
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Doing so yields the following result: Since 1791, the average lag
between ratification of an amendment and its interpretation by the
Court has been approximately 40 years.34 To make this calculation,
cases were searched for interpretation by a member of the majority
coalition on the judgment. “Interpretation” was understood
liberally. Meaningful information about the understanding of an
amendment was sufficient; reasoned elaboration of textual meaning
was not required. For instance, The Steel Seizure Case was counted
as ending the adjudication lag for the Third Amendment because
Justice Jackson’s concurrence pointed to the Amendment during his
broader discussion of the balance of authority between the
President and Congress.35 Furthermore, the calculation is based on
opinions interpreting any part of an amendment. Thus Supreme
Court interpretation of the Petition Clause in 187536 ends the
adjudication lag for the First Amendment as a whole. In this
respect, the duration of adjudication lags is arguably understated.
Regardless, it is clear that the adjudication lag varies
tremendously across constitutional text (Figure 3). For some
amendments, the lag is vanishingly short — just one month for the
Eleventh Amendment. For others, it lasts decades — 162 years for
the Third Amendment. For yet others, the adjudication lag is still
mounting.37 The forces that yield adjudication lags, moreover, are
not necessarily stable over time. The average lag drops below 23
years for the Eleventh through Twenty‐Seventh Amendments. This
could be the result of more than chance.
There is a degree of subjectivity in these results, however.
Aside from the definition of interpretation and its application, the
focus on ratification of Article V amendments is partly a matter of
convenience. Neither individual clauses within amendments nor
the original document is studied here, and one might be interested
in the time lag between any novel constitutional argument and
judicial adjudication. A formal amendment need not be the genesis
of a claim about supreme law. Consider natural law, fundamental
rights, or substantive due process arguments.
Some early
34 An Appendix to this Article lists the cases on which this calculation relies. It also lists
the first citation of each amendment in a majority coalition opinion. This helps set a lower
bound on the interpretation lag. The average “citation lag” in the Supreme Court is about 35
years.
35 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
36 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
37 The Twentieth, Twenty‐Third, and Twenty‐Seventh Amendments are treated as if
they had been interpreted by the Court in 2008. They have not yet been interpreted. This is
a right‐censored data issue, which has not been addressed with hazard rates. See JANET M.
BOX‐STEFFENSMEIER & BRADFORD S. JONES, EVENT HISTORY MODELING: A GUIDE FOR SOCIAL
SCIENTISTS 15–20 (2004).
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advocates indicated that the document reflected, without
exhausting, principles that ought to constrain government action.38
Excessive concentration on one text can miss these intellectual
streams. Likewise, it might be useful to measure the lag between
any judicial opinion referring to historical sources and the age of
those sources. The Court’s rulings on state sovereign immunity are
now disconnected from particular clauses of the document,39 but
this does not mean that the Court is ignoring history.
Nevertheless, the variance in adjudication lags is real, and the
lag from ratification to interpretation can reach a century or more.
Consider the Supreme Court’s experiences with the Eleventh and
Twelfth Amendments. Both were ratified more than 200 years ago
but their adjudication lags are radically different. The Eleventh
Amendment’s constraint on federal court jurisdiction was
addressed one month after its ratification was proclaimed by the
President.40 In 1798, Hollingsworth v. Virginia41 swiftly rejected
arguments that the Amendment was not properly ratified and that
its constraint should not apply to pending cases.42 The Twelfth
Amendment, in contrast, was not even cited by the Supreme Court
until 1892.43 And the Court did not interpret the Twelfth until Ray
v. Blair,44 a full 148 years after ratification.
Variance in the adjudication lag is explicable once recognized.
Constitutional provisions do not share the same character. Some
are prime candidates for judicial use: some text is, or becomes,
vague;45 some text implicates moral choices and threatens existing
interests, as with the Reconstruction Amendments; and some text is
directed at judges, such as Article III. But many other provisions do
not necessarily foretell litigation. Some provisions sunset.46 Some
provisions are little more than coordination devices, such as the
requirement that Congress assemble at least once a year on a

38 See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1335–38 (3d. ed. 2000)
(describing the development of such arguments); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1127–28 (1987) (offering a history of “multiple sources
of fundamental law”).
39 See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002)
(describing the Eleventh Amendment as “but one particular exemplification” of state
sovereign immunity).
40 See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS, 1789‐1888, at 20 (1985).
41 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
42 See id. at 379–82 (describing attorney arguments and the Court’s disposition).
43 See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 26 (1892).
44 343 U.S. 214, 228–31 (1952).
45 See Schauer, supra note 4, at 400–07 (offering clarity as an explanation for dormancy).
46 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (setting a sunset involving regulation of the slave
trade); id. art. V (same).
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default date at high noon.47 Even the facially plausible candidates
for litigation will not always be interpreted by the courts
immediately. A real‐world controversy must arise that is arguably
related to the text. Think about the Bill of Rights while the federal
government’s domestic regulatory presence was in its infancy.
Without an exercise of power implicating these amendments,
litigation could be avoided.48
More broadly, parties must be willing to litigate and courts
must be willing to resolve their claims before adjudication lags end.
The federal constitutional system lacks an advisory opinion process.
Furthermore, judges have always had devices for avoiding issues,
none more than Supreme Court justices. Their docket was declared
almost entirely discretionary by statute in 1988 and they exercised
substantial discretion long before then.49 Judges might be shy about
offering an opinion in one timeframe, even if they become self‐
assured later on.50 On the other side, judges might indicate their
interest in taking up unlitigated constitutional claims.51 Either way,
the judicial agenda will be set by more than the character of
constitutional clauses. A combination of judicial proclivity and
litigant interest will help determine when adjudication lags end.
Many variables are in play but some points are clear. In our
system, nonjudicial actors bear initial responsibility for
understanding the Constitution’s meaning. At least when the
addressees of constitutional text are not judges, others will work
with the text before even the most aggressive court speaks.
Adjudication does not start and finish quickly enough to preempt
debate elsewhere. As well, bits of text will lurk outside the
courtroom only to emerge decades after ratification. Even if Article
V is never used again, we are still bound to witness additional
adjudication lags ending. Courts have yet to render meaning from
all of the document’s clauses. And it is anyone’s guess how the
document’s reference to Letters of Marque and Reprisal might
See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2.
Accord Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to
Politics, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION, supra note 13, at 37, 45, 49.
49 See, e.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 274–75, 295–303 (1991); Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Ducking Trouble:
CongressionallyInduced Selection Bias in the Supreme Court’s Agenda 3, 8–10, 34–35 (Dec. 1,
2007) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (finding that congressional
preferences influenced probability of Supreme Court review of federal statutes enacted
from 1987 to 2001, though perhaps due to party litigation decisions).
50 See Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the
Supreme Court, 19481958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 62–66 (1979) (describing internal Court
deliberations on how to handle Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80 (1955) (upholding an anti‐
miscegenation law)).
51 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937–39 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(relying on the Tenth Amendment but raising a Second Amendment argument).
47
48
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someday influence the legal status of the war on terror.52 This leads
to three further observations about adjudication lags.
First, the phenomenon is not simply a function of a low
amendment rate. Adjudication lags could persist even if the
document were amended every year, assuming that the content of
amendments would not radically change. There is no assurance
that new constitutional text will make its way into the court system
swiftly. Nonetheless, a low amendment rate reduces the likelihood
of short adjudication lags ending in the present time period. It
means fewer fresh targets. Understandably, then, scholars tend to
concentrate on interpretation after long lags. Alternatively, a high
amendment rate might resolve disputes without litigation.
Elements of the Bill of Rights suggest an illustration. One rationale
for the Bill was to calm fears about the intended scope of
congressional authority.53 Still, it is unrealistic to expect that an
amendment process, no matter how lax, will eliminate the
likelihood of litigation in a system that accepts some form of judicial
review.
A second observation goes to practical consequences. The
interpretation and adjudication lags are associated with different
decision environments with different available information. By
definition, no judicial decisions are available until the adjudication
lag runs out. Given enough time, however, parts of the document
will be the subject of cripplingly large commentary from the courts.
In a system that places any weight on the constitutional opinion of
judges, past court decisions will have some influence on future
outcomes. Long interpretation lags, therefore, might present the
opportunity to settle questions by reference to precedent. In
contrast, non‐judicial influences are likely to build over time
regardless. Populations change, preferences shift, facts and
technology evolve, patterns of behavior solidify into traditions and
self‐reinforcing systems.54 If courts are taken seriously and if they
offer opinions on constitutional meaning quickly, then judicial
opinion will become part of the influence on behavior as the
52 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. For an effort to shape understanding of war‐related
authority with the Letters Clause, see Michael D. Ramsey, Text and History in the War Powers
Debate: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1685, 1707 (2002) (“The Marque and
Reprisal Clause gives Congress authority over a limited form of war, while the Declare War
Clause gives Congress control over broader forms of war.”); John C. Yoo, War and the
Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639, 1667–68 (2002) (reading both clauses, to the
contrary, as granting Congress power to characterize legal status rather than to initiate
action).
53 See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 19–43 (1999) (discussing the
enumerated powers assurance and its abandonment by supporters of a Bill of Rights).
54 See, e.g., PIERSON, supra note 17, at 10, 24 (discussing path dependence in politics
through setup costs, learning effects, network effects, and expectation adaptation).
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interpretation lag grows. But if courts act more slowly, if they
intervene only after a lengthy lag, they will more likely face high‐
magnitude changes and the accompanying practical impediments to
judicial influence.
An example is Ray v. Blair,55 which involved presidential
elector freedom. Political parties had been effectively dictating
elector behavior long before Ray was decided in 1952. In fact,
presidential electors might not have ever exercised much
independent judgment.56 Despite these traditions, a candidate for
elector sought greater freedom to deliberate than his state and
party preferred. He contended that those who originally designed
the Electoral College would not have tolerated elector pledges to
alienate their judgment to a national party convention.57 In these
long‐distance encounters with constitutional text, how should
responsible judges behave? For judicial encounters closer in time
to ratification, is the conscientious judge obligated to act differently
than the judge who never had the opportunity to intervene when
the text was young? Should judges time their interventions with
any such difference in mind, if they have the option?58 These are
the sorts of questions explored below.
Third and finally, constitutional interpretation cannot be fully
separated from other types of interpretation. Whenever decision‐
makers look to history, similar issues surface. Think about District
of Columbia v. Heller, which invoked the Second Amendment to
vindicate a qualified right to possess a handgun in one’s home for
self‐defense.59 The Amendment is about 217 years old, but the last
time the Court had directly confronted a claim under the
Amendment was nearly 70 years prior.60 This precedent has its
own historical context and it was followed by a tradition outside the
courts. In fact, the District of Columbia handgun regulation at issue
343 U.S. 214 (1952).
See id. at 229 n.16; EDWARD STANWOOD, A HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY FROM 1788 TO
1897, at 51 (rev. ed. 1928) (quoting a Federalist partisan who criticized a 1796 elector for
“think[ing]” rather than “act[ing]”).
57 Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (Alexander Hamilton) (indicating that electors would engage in a “complicated . . .
investigation” and act “under circumstances favorable to deliberation”), with Ray, 343 U.S.
at 228–30 (permitting a state party to require that primary candidates for elector make
such a pledge).
58 Note a companionship between advocating judicial passivity, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS ch. 4 (1962), and
advocating narrow judicial judgments or deferential judicial attitudes, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 17, 21 (1999). In practical
terms, delayed judicial intervention might amount to judicial minimalism or deference.
59 See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821–22 (2008). The
meaning of Heller is, like the Second Amendment, contested.
60 See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
55
56
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was itself written over 30 years ago.61 Decision‐makers must
determine whether their approach to an information source ought
to be influenced by the distance between the time of decision and
the creation of the source — whether the source is constitutional
text, a statute, a treaty, a regulation, an executive order, a judicial
opinion, evidence of a tradition, and so forth. Most decision‐makers
will not want to age discriminate against all of these sources, but
the degree to which age should matter is an unavoidable judgment.
There are reasons, however, for fixating on the Constitution. A
narrowed focus helps make the discussion more concrete and less
theoretical. We might begin to understand the normative choices
and positive dynamics for supreme law generation, without
forgetting that this situation is analogous to others. Second, the
choices in this field are partly unique. If nothing else, Article V is an
oddity. We can expect something special and perhaps especially
important in the interplay between the formal amendment process,
a low amendment rate, and the alternative methods of creating law.
II. ORIGINALISM’S TRAJECTORIES
The discussion above identifies two different time lags. Both
raise issues for interpretive methods that rely on historical
arguments. Indeed a large part of the debate over interpretative
method and decision‐making in the courts can be organized around
these time‐related questions. The next step is to fill out the options.
This Part sketches some possible and plausible trajectories for the
strength of originalism in decision‐making over time, and it begins
to investigate how the Supreme Court has reacted to the time
variable in actual constitutional cases.
A.

The Possible and the Plausible

“Originalism” has been used to mean several distinct ideas. Its
versions are briefly reviewed in Part III.A, below. For now, we can
use the term loosely to encompass a range of historical arguments
about the meaning of constitutional text. These arguments might
target drafter intent, or ratifier understanding, or public meaning, or
some other fact question for the purpose of illuminating textual
meaning at the time of adoption. Clearly excluded are bald
61 See Brief of Petitioner at 4–6, Heller, 128 S. Ct. 645 (No. 07‐290) (describing handgun
data relied on by the D.C. City Council in 1976).
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arguments about the best meaning according to present needs.
Tradition and practice after ratification are likewise excluded, unless
specifically used to understand meaning at the point of ratification.
But this leaves room for many historical sources and arguments in
Supreme Court opinions that can all be counted as originalist.
Although a narrower definition of originalism would better fit
today’s intellectual trends, it might drastically reduce the number of
Court opinions available for analysis.
Whichever version of originalism ought to be prioritized,
constitutional decision‐makers must assign it a strength value in
relation to other considerations. This is true whether one believes
that nothing but originalism qualifies as “interpretation” or whether
that term is defined capaciously enough to include other activities.
Because the strength value for originalism in decision‐making could
change over time, there are an infinite number of trajectories that
originalism’s influence might follow. Everything depends on how
temporal distance from ratification might affect the normative
arguments for and against the use of originalist inquiry in decisions
that affect people. Begin by considering the following trajectories:
(1) Loyal

(2) Skeptical

high
strength

low
strength

t1

t100

t1

(3) Compromise

t100

(4) Counterintuitive

high
strength

low
strength

t1

t100

t1

t100
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The first pair of trajectories is insensitive to the passage of
time. Originalism sustains its strength level regardless of the
distance between ratification (t1) and subsequent time periods.
Opposition to the relevance of time does not depend on support for
originalist methods. One can believe that the post‐ratification date
of interpretation is irrelevant and either dogmatically support
originalism or instead deny its value.
Both positions are, however, extreme. To defend the loyal
curve, no amount of progress in understanding human affairs and
no degree of change in technology, sociology, morality, economics,
politics or international relations can affect the overriding influence
of originalism. One would have to remain deeply resistant to legal
change and think such stasis possible, or believe the world does not
actually change in important ways, or have total faith in the formal
amendment process, or possess confidence that past constitutional
decisions will always incorporate adequate flexibility to serve
contemporary needs.62 To defend the skeptical curve, originalism
must be repudiated by the Court no matter how static the world,
clear the sentiment on constitutional meaning or close in time to
ratification. The Court would be required, on the afternoon of
ratification, to interpret constitutional text without relying at all on
originalist inquiries.
This probably requires equally heroic
assumptions or unconventional values.
The other pair of trajectories represents an emerging
compromise for originalism’s strength, along with a
counterintuitive alternative.
The compromise curve shows
originalism at the apex of its strength when decision‐makers are
close in time to ratification, and then a negative slope for
subsequent time periods as originalism fades. The intuition is that
originalist inquiries at the Supreme Court are more desirable, more
feasible, and perhaps inevitable when constitutional text has just
been ratified. Thereafter, the justifications and pressures pointing
toward originalism dwindle. The optimal shape of this curve is
open to debate, but several scholars suggest this moderated
position on originalism.63 Hence the issue that divides many
theorists is originalism’s strength at t100, not at t1.
At least theoretically, this compromise trajectory can be turned
upside down. On this option, originalism begins weakly and gains
strength in decision‐making with time. No one appears to advocate
this trajectory as a normative matter.64 It might well show an
62 Originalist inquiry might yield flexibility on these points, but that would be a result of
good fortune rather than a judgment at t100 that originalism should be moderated.
63 See supra note 10 (collecting sources).
64 The counterintuitive curve might accurately describe the ebb and flow of originalist
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inexplicably delayed onset of nostalgia for antiquated decisions.
But on certain conditions and for certain situations, a move from
weaker to stronger originalism in the judiciary is defensible. Or so I
shall suggest.65
Before proceeding, two qualifications should be noted. First,
time is only a proxy. Its passage after ratification indicates that
originalism’s desirability or feasibility might have to be
reconsidered, without showing exactly why. Plotting a trajectory
for originalism’s strength is therefore difficult, even if we are solely
interested in the normative question. Second, a sound normative
judgment requires a confrontation with judicial precedent. After
the adjudication lag ends, precedent might rightly alter the shape of
originalism’s curve.66
To the extent adjudication lags are
unpredictable, settling on a preferable trajectory for originalism in
the abstract becomes that much more challenging.
B.

Supreme Court Practice

How have courts actually used originalism over time? This
question can be answered only with a panoramic content analysis
of judicial opinions, which has not been done. If it were done, it
would reveal arguments made for public consumption and not
necessarily true motivating forces. And even if opinions do reveal
reasons, interpretive method can be opaque. Adverting to history
could be a search for wisdom or universal truths, while relying on
case law could be functionally originalist if the precedent is
grounded in originalism. Hence the value of an exhaustive inquiry
argument at the Supreme Court for certain parts of the document. Such a trend can be the
result of, for example, newly appointed justices. Here I treat such influences as contributing
to a positive account of originalism’s strength, rather than a justification for those
trajectories.
65 See infra Part III.D.4 (discussing randomization).
66 Use of precedent‐based arguments to defuse originalist inquiries is commonplace.
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 577–81 (2001) (arguing that precedent is itself often
accepted as legitimate law). But note that the strength of originalist‐like methods might
increase based on judicial precedent. This would happen if (1) the precedent should be
taken seriously for a non‐originalist reason and (2) the precedent directs subsequent judges
to undertake historical inquiry. Just as originalist interpretation theoretically can direct
judges to make contemporary moral judgments, non‐originalist sources theoretically can
direct judges to make historical inquiries. Yet these are distinct analytical routes. For one
thing, originalism and non‐originalism offer different ways for revising initial impressions.
A strong originalist should want better historical argument before reversing her historical
judgment that moral reasoning is required by the Constitution, while a common‐law
constitutionalist might test his commitment to precedent‐supported historical inquiry
against the length of this judicial tradition and right reason.
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into written opinions might exceed the cost of the effort.
A truncated review of Supreme Court cases is nonetheless
useful.
It provides real‐world examples of the trajectories
illustrated above. In addition, it can test a supposition about Court
behavior: that originalism is likely to be the dominant rhetorical
strategy, and perhaps the only feasible basis for decision, when
opinions are rendered shortly after ratification. But it turns out
that originalist arguments are not exclusive in those time periods.
Nor do originalist arguments always disappear after constitutional
text ages. Instead, originalism’s popularity seems to have followed
influences largely unrelated to the logic of time lags.
1.

First encounters with text

One strategy for understanding the relationship between time
and originalism is to scrutinize the end of adjudication lags. By
isolating opinions in which the Supreme Court first interprets
constitutional text, the availability of on‐point judicial precedent is
eliminated and originalism could become more attractive. This is
especially true for judicial interpretation shortly after ratification.
According to conventional wisdom, anyway, originalism should
dominate in this context if nowhere else. The end of long
adjudication lags might be informative as well. Although this class
of cases also minimizes the role of precedent, here the Court must
assess the relevance of non‐judicial events and practices since
ratification. Unfortunately, only a small number of cases fit these
categories (the result of a low amendment rate). And it would be
best to know the strength of originalism in other constitutional
cases decided at similar times. There might be interpretive epochs
more influential than the length of adjudication lags, even if it is not
quite true that “the most important fact about any case is its date.”67
Given these limitations, the analysis can be relatively concise.
a.

Short lags

Ten of the Supreme Court’s adjudication lags have ended
within 10 years of an amendment’s ratification. Often an originalist
element is fairly apparent.68 Consider the Warren Court’s first
67 L.H. LaRue, Constitutional Law and Constitutional History, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 373, 373
(1987).
68 See United States v. Chambers, 291 U.S. 217, 222–23, 226 (1934) (referring to what
“the people” accomplished in the Twenty‐First Amendment); Newberry v. United States,
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interpretation of the Twenty‐Fourth Amendment, which declares
that the right to vote in federal elections “shall not be denied or
abridged . . . by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”
The justices of this era were known to offer historical arguments in
constitutional cases,69 but they are not known for a commitment to
originalism. Yet the uncelebrated case of Harman v. Forssenius,70
decided one year after the Amendment’s ratification, is heavy with
originalist themes. The Court held that Virginia could not offer
prospective federal voters a choice among paying back poll taxes,
annually filing a certificate of residency, or not voting. Chief Justice
Warren’s opinion for the Court begins with the text of the
Amendment, it summarizes the forerunning congressional debates
over poll taxes, and it highlights the expressed concerns of
proponents to create an interpretive background.71
We cannot confidently say that Harman is entirely originalist.
The opinion cites precedent along with the Amendment’s text for
the proposition that Virginia’s certificate alternative was an invalid
penalty on a right.72 And it relies on case law to reject, as
insufficiently urgent, the Commonwealth’s argument from
administrative necessity.73 Now, even these passages might be
consistent with a form of originalism; one could say that the
referenced case law indicated a well‐understood background
against which the Constitution was amended in 1964. But the
opinion itself is unclear on this point. The safest conclusion is that
the Warren Court was willing to use originalist themes close in time
to ratification, but that originalism is probably not a complete
account of either the rhetoric of Harman or the underlying reasons
for the judgment. It is not as if the Virginia statute accorded with
the Court’s general attitude toward burdens on voting imposed by
Southern states.
256 U.S. 232, 250, 252–53 (1921) (relying on the drafting history of the Seventeenth
Amendment); Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 10–21 (1916) (using Pollock v.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), as context for understanding the Sixteenth
Amendment). SlaughterHouse Cases ended the adjudication lag for two Amendments. See
83 U.S. 36, 71–72, 77–78 (1873) (ascertaining a general purpose for the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments).
69 See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
70 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
71 See id. at 529, 538–40; see also id. at 540, 543–44 (noting a pre‐Amendment concern
about African‐American disenfranchisement and racist origins of Virginia’s prior poll tax
regime).
72 See id. at 540–41.
73 See id. at 542–43 (finding a “lack of necessity” after referencing Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (involving equal protection and voting rights), which was decided
after the Twenty‐Fourth Amendment was ratified, and Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,
646–47 (1948) (involving equal protection and escheat of land turning on parental
noncitizenship)).
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Lack of clarity in interpretive method reaches other cases in
this set. Consider the startling Prohibition Era case of Rhode Island
v. Palmer,74 which was decided within a year of the Eighteenth
Amendment’s ratification. Without explanation, the majority
offered no fewer than eleven conclusions on the validity and
meaning of the Amendment.75 The conclusions were presented in
numbered paragraphs, like a syllabus without the customary
opinion thereafter. Some of these holdings were significant.
Conclusion 11 was that Congress had authority to reach beverages
containing as little as 0.5% alcohol by volume.76 Again, the majority
might have used some version of originalist interpretation to reach
these results, or it might have constructed meaning in the face of
vagueness, or it might have made a pragmatic or policy judgment to
free the hands of politics. We cannot know with confidence.
Reticence is not the only departure from originalist argument
within the ratifying generation. A bolder option is to interpret new
text in conformity with the Court’s normative commitments. Here
the standout is Osborn v. Nicholson.77
Osborn came seven years after the Thirteenth Amendment’s
ratification. It considered how the abolition of slavery might affect
the apportionment of losses among commercial participants in the
slave trade. With thick natural law themes, a majority concluded
that the Amendment should not inhibit a slave seller’s demand for
payment from a slave buyer where their contract was formed
before the Amendment. The Court called the protection of such
contracts “a principle of universal jurisprudence. A different rule
would shake the social fabric to its foundations and let in a flood‐
tide of intolerable evils.”78 In light of this normative view, the
majority shifted the interpretive burden to disfavor statutory repeal
or the destruction of so‐called vested rights. These outcomes would
require an implication “so clear as to be equivalent to an explicit
declaration. . . . . There is nothing in the language of the
amendment which in the slightest degree warrants the inference
that those who framed or those who adopted it intended that such
should be its effect.”79
There is a crosscurrent here.
Osborn incorporates an
253 U.S. 350 (1920).
See id. at 384–88 (quoting constitutional text and offering conclusions).
See id. at 387–88; see also Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 381–82
(1798) (reporting lawyers’ arguments and the bare conclusions of the Court).
77 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 654 (1872).
78 Id. at 662.
79 Id. (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.), in
asserting that a different rule would be “contrary to ‘the general principles of law and
reason’”).
74
75
76
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originalist thought about intentions. Yet this comes after a clear‐
statement rule is erected and this rule is grounded in natural law.
While any such principle of “universal jurisprudence” might be
another background assumption against which amendments are
supposed to be drafted, Osborn seems more assertive than this. In
fact, the majority reserved the question whether it would honor an
amendment that explicitly rearranged such property rights among
private parties. After mentioning “fundamental principles of the
social compact,” the majority remarked: “What would be the effect
of an amendment of the National Constitution reaching so far — if
such a thing should occur — it is not necessary to consider, as no
such question is presented in the case before us.”80
b.

Long lags

If opinions that end adjudication lags swiftly are
methodologically mixed, what about longer delays between
ratification and adjudication?
Today the Supreme Court’s
declarations on constitutional meaning are so often adorned with
judicial precedent that it might take a moment to recall options
other than case law and originalism. But forces beyond precedent
may diminish originalism’s strength, and precedent is unavailable
when adjudication lags end.
One standard alternative is deference to the considered
judgment of other institutions. This decision strategy was on
display no later than McCulloch v. Maryland.81 And the Court has
not indicated that deference is due only to the originalist judgments
of others. A related ground for dampening originalism is extended
practice outside the courts.
Tradition can be a factor in
constitutional adjudication regardless of whether it informs the
Court about original meaning, understanding, or intent.
To take one example, tradition was overpowering in Ray v.
Blair. Ending the Twelfth Amendment’s 148‐year adjudication lag,
the majority could not have been much more anti‐originalist. They
indicated no interest in resetting the presidential election system to
accord with any hope or understanding in 1789 of independent
deliberation by electors. That life had departed from these designs
was given as a reason for judicial blessing, not intervention. The
majority announced that it would place heavy weight on
Id. at 662–63
17 U.S. 316, 401–02 (1819). McCulloch ended an adjudication lag for the Tenth
Amendment, and it does intimate an originalist argument on that issue. See id. at 406–07
(contrasting the Amendment with text in the Articles of Confederation).
80
81
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contemporary practice backed by tradition — “[t]his long‐
continued practical interpretation of the constitutional propriety of
an implied or oral pledge of his ballot by a candidate for elector.”82
Although the majority could have believed that elector
independence dwindled so quickly after the founding that those
responsible for the Twelfth Amendment must have ratified the
change,83 the argument is not clearly and not solely the basis for the
judgment.
Still, the anti‐originalist path does not dominate, even in cases
decided many decades after ratification. The most interesting
examples occur shortly before the Lochner era arrived in full
force.84 No long adjudication lag for an Amendment ended during
the heart of the Lochner period, but Osborn confirms that natural
law reasoning was alive in 1872 and further previews of
substantive due process rights were issued by 1877.85 Yet the Court
drew on originalist sources when it ended two long adjudication
lags in this era. These opinions speak to the First and Eighth
Amendments.86
Wilkerson v. Utah87 interpreted the Eighth Amendment 87
years after ratification but nevertheless made space for originalist
analysis. One issue addressed was whether a trial judge could order
death by public shooting as the punishment for first‐degree murder.
The Court did cite contemporary military practice in affirming the
penalty,88 but it also reviewed founding era punishments that

82 Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 229–30 (1952) (noting the contemporary laws of twenty
states); see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY,
1888‐1986, at 371 (1990) (charactering Ray as a “sobering reminder of the limited capacity
of law to affect human behavior”).
83 See Ray, 343 U.S. at 228 & n.16 (quoting congressional debate); cf. TADAHISA KURODA,
THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC,
1787‐1804, at 171–72 (1994) (asserting that the Amendment “in effect recognized the
existence of national political parties”).
84 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
85 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125–26, 134 (1877) (rejecting the instant attack on a
rate cap, however); TRIBE, supra note 38, at 1341–52 (detailing the era).
86 To be fair, both Amendments had received glancing attention from the Court without
pressing originalist themes. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875)
(holding that the Petition Clause is not directly applicable to the states); Pervear v.
Massachusetts, 72 U.S. 475, 479–80 (1866) (holding that the Eighth Amendment does not
apply to the states, but then concluding, in the alternative, that the Amendment was not
violated by imprisoning the defendant for selling liquor without a license); cf. Ex parte
Watkins, 32 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1833) (denying jurisdiction over a sentence and stating, in
the alternative, that an excessive fine could not be shown on the record). These earlier
cases are used in my calculation of the adjudication lag because they provide information on
a majority’s view of constitutional text. But these cases offer little or no insight into the
Court’s preferred method of constitutional interpretation or argument.
87 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
88 See id. at 134–35.
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supposedly had been repudiated by the Amendment.89 Reynolds v.
United States90 is comparable. It interpreted the Free Exercise
Clause in the same year, at the same temporal distance from
ratification, and with significant reliance on originalist history.91
The opinion also asserts polygamy’s threat to social order and
democracy, and it objects to exemptions from criminal statutes for
religiously motivated conduct,92 but the Court did strive to link its
views to 1791.
The end of adjudication lags educates us about what is
possible, or at least what was possible, for constitutional argument
in the courts. Without precedent to rely on and close in time to
ratification, the Court often pushed originalist themes. But not
exclusively and not always. Decades after ratification, the picture is
not radically different. Several opinions depart from originalist
themes and invoke alternative considerations, sometimes pointing
to events intervening between ratification and judicial
interpretation. But not always and not exclusively.
2.

Extended interpretive trajectories

With such variability, it should not be surprising to find long‐
term interpretive trajectories matching a number of curves for
originalism’s strength in decision‐making.
The compromise trajectory sketched above, with originalism’s
strength declining over time, tracks the path of several doctrinal
fields. The leading candidates for this trajectory are areas of
constitutional argument now immersed in case law. Contemporary
analysis of cruel and unusual punishment, along with the
boundaries of religion and its free exercise, have become largely the
domain of common‐law reasoning,93 regardless of earlier originalist
themes and occasional backtracking.94 It might be that today’s
results could be reached with overtly originalist inquiry, but they
tend not to be. And the path back to originalist arguments in the
precedent is a long one.
Other trajectories are present. It is possible to view Speech
See id. at 134–37.
98 U.S. 145 (1878).
See id. at 162–65 (focusing on ratification era history, including state law).
See id. at 165–66 (citing an academic’s opinion).
See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (judging excessive punishment by
“standards . . . that currently prevail”); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79
(1990) (resolving textual ambiguity with a rendition of precedent).
94 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 722–25 & n.6 (2004) (relying on a “historic and
substantial state interest” in not funding devotional theology degrees).
89
90
91
92
93
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Clause doctrine as bumping along on a relatively skeptical curve,
with the occasional spike toward originalism. When Speech Clause
complaints received attention at the Court as a result of World War
I related prosecutions, ratification era history did not seem
important to the justices.95 The same is usually true today.96 There
are, of course, important exceptions.97 But no one familiar with the
doctrine would characterize its originalism as more than episodic.
It is also possible to understand Seventh Amendment
arguments as somewhat consistently tied to history. The Court’s
analytical framework for triggering a jury trial right in federal court
typically includes a significant originalist element.98 Certainly the
Court has dealt with new circumstances creatively, and its
analogical reasoning may treat the old division between law and
equity as quite loose guidance.99 Still, the originalist streak is there.
Less intuitive trajectories exist as well. Consider Fourth
Amendment cases. Putting aside early and fairly uninformative
treatments,100 originalism appears to have a U‐shaped relationship
to the doctrine. A crucial opinion early in the Court’s doctrinal
development is Boyd v. United States,101 and it was laced with
originalist history. The Court indicated that its aim was to know
“the minds of those who framed the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”102 By
the 1960s, however, the theme shifted. An exclusionary rule for the
states was adopted with reference to “reason and truth” rather than
ratification history,103 pragmatic interest balancing was injected
into the doctrine often to serve law enforcement interests,104 and
See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down Internet regulation); Cent.
Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (striking down advertising
regulation).
97 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–43 (1995) (relying in
part on history and tradition of anonymous political advocacy); Patterson v. Colorado, 205
U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (citing Blackstone’s Commentaries).
98 See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476,
487 (1935); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446–47 (1830) (asserting what must
have been “present to the minds of the framers of the amendment” when they preserved the
right).
99 See, e.g., Curtis, 415 U.S. at 193 (permitting analogy to modern statutory claims from
common‐law forms of action and their remedies); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10
(1970) (referring to “practical abilities and limitations of juries” as a third prong of the
inquiry).
100 See Den ex dem Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
285–86 (1856) (holding the Warrant Clause inapplicable to a creditors’ civil action);
Livingston’s Lessee v. Moore, 32 U.S. 469, 478–79, 482, 539, 551–52 (1833) (denying the
claimant’s Bill of Rights arguments as inapplicable to states, though without citing the
Fourth Amendment).
101 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
102 Id. at 626–27, 630.
103 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez‐Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555–67 (1976) (upholding a
95
96
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the Court was open to updating Fourth Amendment concepts when
applied to new technologies.105 Yet lately this kind of innovation
seems stalled. In some recent opinions, historical arguments have
been featured. Although the majority did not fully follow its
suggestion, Wyoming v. Houghton106 indicates that originalist
history deserves lexical priority in judging the reasonableness of
searches.107
Finally, consider substantive due process doctrine. Originalism
might bear an upside down U‐shaped relationship to a strand of it.
Admittedly this picture of the doctrinal development requires
imagination. But the curve starts to appear by concentrating on
three case groupings. The first is Chief Justice Taney’s nonhistorical
reference to slaveowner property rights in Dred Scott,108 coupled
with the “fair” and “reasonable” test of Lochner v. New York.109
Second is the essential common‐law privileges depicted in Meyer v.
Nebraska,110 plus the references to “deeply rooted” national history
in Bowers v. Hardwick.111 The third and final point on the curve is
the evolutionary understanding of liberty as a judicially enforceable
concept in Lawrence v. Texas.112 It is not clear that any routine
normative logic prescribes this trend.
My objective is not comprehensiveness. Nor is it to elevate
past judicial practice into a test of sound decision‐making. My aim
is to confirm a variety of approaches across time. It is extremely
unlikely that this variety can be eliminated by additional
investigation, or justified by one normative theory.
Instead, we can begin to account for the various trajectories by
pointing out multiple forces that operate to produce judicial
opinions. If nothing else, the mix of methods is likely to change with
the Court’s personnel. Perhaps this is more probable today, when
border patrol checkpoint); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968) (permitting stop and frisk).
105 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) (relying on precedent as well
as “the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication”).
106 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
107 See id. at 299–300, 303 (turning to balancing after the majority’s review of judicial
precedent on originalist history suggested no violation); see also Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318, 327–45 (2001) (presenting a history of arrest and judging it inconclusive).
108 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857) (Taney, C.J.).
109 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). In one sentence, Lochner asserts “the Fourteenth Amendment
was not designed to interfere” with reasonable conditions on property and liberty. Id. at 53.
110 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
111 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Bowers did rely on
much more. See id. at 190–95 (characterizing case law, recent history, and the judiciary’s
proper role).
112 539 U.S. 558, 564–72 (2003) (relying on case law and principle and complexifying
history). Even Lawrence waved at originalism, however. See id. at 579 (asserting that
drafters and ratifiers of the Due Process Clauses “knew times can blind us to certain
truths”).
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commitments to precedent or originalism are considered
qualifications for judicial appointments. Along these lines, the
demands of interest groups, political elites, or the public in general
might shift and influence Court judgments and Court opinions.
Decision‐making methods might be adjusted to become more
plausible to salient audiences. And the Court’s power relative to
other institutions will vary over time, which could likewise
influence its freedom to select its decision‐making methods.
There is no reason to expect that judicial decision‐making
trends will match an abstract normative vision of progress. Too
many forces are at work. It might be that there is no rational
“trajectory” here at all. But there is still reason to formulate a
vision. The history of constitutional adjudication in the judiciary
shows that much is possible, given the right conditions.
III. ORIGINALISM’S VERSIONS AND VULNERABILITIES
We are now in a better position to evaluate the appropriate
relationship between originalism and time. More specifically,
should originalism’s strength decline when the distance from
ratification is long? My response comes in three steps. First, I
briefly specify a popular version of originalism. In academic circles,
the general notion of original public meaning is surging. Second, I
summarize key criticisms of originalism, and I stress the
importance of time lags to these critiques. I also question the
critic’s typical concession that originalism is proper shortly after
ratification. Originalism is sometimes weaker than that. Third, in
the next Part, I push back in the other direction. Justifications for
originalism are organized and evaluated according to their promise
in besting time‐oriented objections. Justifications with longevity
are thus prioritized.
A.

Originalism’s Alternatives

Rational decisions are a function of information and judgment
within a given setting. Actors in institutions have particular
objectives and capacities, and they select data that seem relevant to
serving those goals within those competencies.113
One
113 See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 4–5 (stressing intelligent institutional choice as
necessary for translating social goals into policy choices); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian
Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003) (arguing that
debates about legal interpretation must account for institutional capacities and dynamic
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informational input is law. Legal interpretation may then be
thought of as a process by which information is derived from
sources recognized as law for the purpose of decision‐making.
Scholarship regarding which activities count as “interpretation” is
divided,114 but, however one specifies the concept, interpretation
involves meaning and it is done for various reasons.
My concern is interpretation of a legal text for the purpose of
decision‐making, including in a court with authority to issue
judgments. Here the relevance of any interpretive method is not in
its ability to specify meaning in the abstract, but rather in its
capacity to influence actual decisions that affect social life. From
this vantage, originalism is worth studying insofar as it indicates
normative prescriptions for decision‐making.
But “originalism” is a label covering several distinguishable
methods, and each version might be justified in different ways.
Indeed, the prevailing version and its justifications have adapted
over time.115 In general, originalism turns contemporary actors
toward sources of information that were generated in the past so as
to preserve, rather than revisit, a previous decision. Those who
engage in originalism are supposed to understand the meaning of a
previous decision and to remain faithful to that decision without
making their own judgment about its propriety. It will not always
be clear how best to preserve the meaning of a decision in a new
setting. And even after understanding something about “preserving
meaning” across time, the idea might be operationalized through
any number of protocols.
We can begin by considering originalism as a method of
assigning meaning to a legal text. Originalism need not be cabined
effects); see generally Samaha, supra note 9, at 633–34, 675–77 (discussing law as
information).
114 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 58–64 (1994)
(emphasizing the interpreter’s perspective in generating textual meaning); Stanley Fish,
Intention Is All there Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive Interpretation in Law,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109, 1112, 1114 (2008) (asserting that finding authorial intent “is”
interpretation, but that the concept lacks guidance for how to ascertain intent); Kent
Greenawalt, Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 268, 268–70 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002) (including text, original meaning, underlying rationale or basic values, application to
particular cases, and stare decisis in a description of legal interpretation).
115 See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 603–13
(2004); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134–48 (2003). Other recent intellectual
histories include DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER
ORIGINALISM 20–154 (2005), and JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 101–216 (2005). A relatively unsympathetic review is
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006).
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in this way; it might roam more freely into history. Still, self‐
described originalists commonly present their approach as a (or
the) way to understand written law for the purpose of decision‐
making, and some advocates of originalist methods may prefer to
identify themselves as “textualists.”116 The analysis below generally
applies either way, but it will focus on originalism as an option for
providing information about the written Constitution’s meaning.
This leaves several choices. Considering the debates of self‐
described originalists and their critics, additional dimensions
emerge. Contested elements of originalism’s optimal design have
included: (1) the specific informational objective for the method,
such as drafters’ intent or ratifiers’ understanding or a more
general public meaning; (2) the sources and reasoning acceptable
for reaching that objective, such as nonpublic drafting history,
dictionaries, legal treatises, and post‐ratification practice; (3) the
level of generality at which historical lessons are drawn — or
whether to prefer concepts over conceptualizations, or general
principles over expected applications; (4) the degree of confidence
with which historical judgments must be made and the resources
appropriately devoted to obtaining these answers; (5) the relative
strength of originalist inquiry in a decision process compared to
other factors; and (6) decision rules for situations in which the
method “runs out” and ends in uncertainty.117 This information
must then be brought to bear on a contemporary dispute. A
decision‐maker might understand a text’s meaning for one era
without having confidence about its application to a particular
dispute in a subsequent era.118 And because there are still shifting
116 See ANTONIN SCALIA, CommonLaw Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 22–23, 37–38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
117 This rendition of choices was informed by RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89–113 (2004); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 139–160 (1990); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN
ROBES 118–23 (2006); DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 525–52 (2d ed. 2005); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS
IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–22 (1997); TRIBE, supra note 38, at 47–70; KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 34–37 (1999); Stephen M. Griffin, 2008 Rebooting Originalism 1185;
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989); William Michael
Treanor, Taking Text too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of
Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487 (2007); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk
(Dec. 30, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1078933);
Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, (U. Ill. Coll. Law Pub. Law & Legal Research,
Working Paper No. 07‐24, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244. For an
argument that “originalism” has evolved and multiplied in its versions, see Thomas B. Colby
& Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism (Geo. Wash. U. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 393, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090282.
118 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47
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disagreements over the optimal form, one cannot specify a
universal and fixed version of originalism.
To evaluate arguments within the intellectual mainstream, I
will focus on “original public meaning originalism.”
One
formulation of its informational goal is “the public or objective
meaning that a reasonable listener would place on the words used
in the constitutional provision at the time of its enactment.”119 This
goal can be related to ordinary sentence meaning in accord with
conventional usage at ratification, rather than anyone’s subjective
intentions. However, more direction is required to make the
general inquiry useful to decision‐makers. A variety of sources and
arguments might still be accepted as relevant beyond, say, old
dictionaries and legal treatises.120 It does seem clear, however, that
the level of generality for this inquiry is not predetermined.
Contemporary proponents of original public meaning in
constitutional interpretation indicate that such questions are
themselves historical, or involve normative commitments external
to originalism properly understood.121
Whether a clause
incorporates general concepts or more particular conceptions
would then depend on what a reasonable observer would have
concluded at the time of adoption.
The notion of original public meaning’s strength is worth
STAN. L. REV. 395, 401–02, 442–43 (1995); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 588–90, 593–98 (2003) (exploring how new
circumstances might reveal indeterminacy in the text’s original public meaning).
119 BARNETT, supra note 117, at 92. For other formulations in the same family, with
differing degrees of connection to a public understanding that actually existed at some point
in time, see Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV.
26, 29 (2000); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 115, at 1132, 1143–45 & n.113 (looking to a
“hypothetical, objective, reasonably well‐informed reader”); Gary Lawson, Delegation and
Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002) (looking to “a fully informed public
audience, knowing all that there is to know about the Constitution and the surrounding
world”); Scalia, supra note 116, at 17 (looking for “the intent that a reasonable person
would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris”);
see also BORK, supra note 117, at 144 (“[W]hat the ratifiers understood themselves to be
enacting must be taken to be what the public of that time would have understood the words
to mean. . . . . The search is not for a subjective intention.”); Michael W. McConnell,
Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (1998) (looking
for the understanding of “the ratifying public”); cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 117, at 34–37,
194–96 (looking for evidence of ratifiers’ intent); Solum, supra note 117, at 3–6 (looking for
the conventional semantic meaning of clauses).
120 Compare, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 117, at 92–93 (demoting nonpublic drafting
history), with Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 115, at 1118–20 (contending such history can
be evidence of how “the hypothetical Ratifier” understood the text).
121 See BARNETT, supra note 117, at 119–20; BORK, supra note 117, at 149; see also
WHITTINGTON, supra note 117, at 186–87 (arguing from speaker intentions rather than
correct semantic meaning). A contrary view seems to be Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and
Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293–95 (2007) (relying on constitutional text
plus high‐level principle and disregarding original expected applications, but not clearly or
solely on historical grounds).
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pausing over. As emphasized above, we ought to investigate how
originalism influences decisions of consequence, and that mission
calls for a comparison between the directions indicated by
originalist inquiry and any other effects on decision‐making.
Advocates have indicated that original public meaning originalism
is the proper method of interpreting constitutional text and that it
should strongly influence judicial decisions in constitutional cases,
perhaps to the exclusion of other resources such as precedent.122
Regardless whether one defines “interpretation” and “meaning”
differently from these proponents, the central issue for us is how
influential their prescription ought to be within concrete decision
situations.
It is true that some originalists emphasize the limits of their
interpretive method. They do not believe it can exhaust the text’s
meaning. Vagueness or other uncertainty will persist, which might
be resolved through “constitutional construction” inside or outside
the judiciary.123 The more vagueness one sees, the less pressure
originalist interpretation can exert on decision‐making. It is even
possible that many of today’s actual debates over constitutional
meaning cannot be resolved with originalist interpretation, strictly
speaking. The meaning of the written Constitution might be mostly
supplied through construction and, depending on the decision rules
for that domain, the document could be “living” within that
abundant space. Freedom to construct should not be oversold,
however. Whenever determinate meaning is yielded by originalist
interpretation, a proponent might believe that judges and others
should abide by it always or at least in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances. In any event, attention is owed to versions of
originalism designed to significantly influence decisions.124
122 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 117, at 5; Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with
Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 269 (2005) (stating
precedent should fall when inconsistent with a determinate original public meaning);
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 115, at 1142–45.
123 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 117, at 7 (stating that “constitutional construction is
essentially political”); Solum, supra note 117, at 68; see also Nelson, supra note 118, at 597–
98 (observing that originalists can accept a role for nonjudicial actors in liquidating
indeterminacy, though that domain may not be well‐defined); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 296 n.18 (2005)
(contending that indeterminacy after originalist interpretation should yield democratic
discretion); cf. BARNETT, supra note 117, at 118–23 (characterizing constitutional
construction as principled gap filling to resolve cases after originalist interpretation runs
out). Much of the analysis below regards the prescription that courts ascertain and enforce
original public meaning through “interpretation,” without speaking to “construction.” In a
final section, I explore a use for history that would not plainly qualify as “interpretation” as
these scholars use the term. See infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing randomization).
124 For now, we might bracket the necessary degree of confidence and deserved
resources. It seems likely that originalism’s proponents are willing to accept substantial
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Skeptics will have already retrieved a mental list of common
objections to originalism, including doubts as to whether originalist
questions are constraining or even intelligible. A standard reaction
is to wonder whether it is meaningful to ask, “What would a
reasonable person who lived here in 1789 (or later) have thought
about the validity of x if x had occurred then instead of in 2008, or if
he were alive in 2008 when x actually occurred?” These deep
objections might be persuasive in certain respects, but they can be
deferred. For now, recall that many critics of originalism can accept
its use when the interpretation lag is short, that a measure of
originalism is a feature of public judicial reasoning, and that a
substantial audience is willing to at least consider originalist
methods. Given the persistence of originalism as an option, skeptics
and enthusiasts might pause to ask how, if at all, originalism’s
influence should vary over time.
B.

TimeOriented Criticism

Suppose that a judge must interpret words that were ratified in
accord with Article V and that are now considered supreme law. In
one possible universe, the word string W was ratified a century ago.
In an alternative universe, W was ratified last year. The question is
whether a judge ought to approach the interpretation and use of W–
old differently from W–new in rendering her decision.
To move forward, there must be an account of this decision‐
maker’s goals. These accounts are contested even as a matter of
accurate description, and certainly there is no universally agreed‐
upon rendering of good judicial behavior. The continuing debate
over interpretive method suggests this much. Instead, the analysis
will begin with a series of hopefully plausible elements of
appropriate judicial conduct, and then add a concession to
simplicity.
Much of the discussion will apply on different
assumptions, so the reader need not suspend disagreement with
these choices. But a general, initial picture of judicial objectives will
be constructive.
Assume, then, that our judge is public spirited and committed
to improving social well‐being in a lawful way. She is acting with
the best intentions, she wants to follow her oath to faithfully
perform her duties under the Constitution, and she is of at least
average competence. Furthermore, this judge understands the
decision costs to achieve relatively high degrees of certainty about public meaning and its
limits, but it could be that only some decision‐makers should engage in the most extensive
historical inquiry. Trial courts, for example, might not be well suited to the task.
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practical limits of acting within her institution, her personal
abilities and the normative questions surrounding any assumption
of power. She is self‐aware, practical and honestly searching for the
best interpretive method.125
To simplify the analysis, however, it will help to bracket intra‐
judicial strategy for the time being.126 Assume that the judge need
not convince fellow judges that her understanding of W is correct,
now or as a matter of coordinating judicial decisions in the future.
Nor does she have reason to act strategically in light of other judges’
preferences. There is one Supreme Court, she is it, and she is not
concerned with her reputation in the lower courts.
1.

Objections summarized

A heartfelt critic of originalism might advise that, whatever the
judge does, she should not look backward to historical sources
associated with the text. And she should avoid these resources
whether the target for interpretation is W–old or W–new. True, recent
history will likely influence the judge’s reading. She will not be able
to ignore the linguistic conventions of her time when she first
scrutinizes the text. But the true critic would maintain that no
special effort should be made toward re‐creating a historical
context, however recent, that does not now exist.
Other
considerations would fill the gap, and the options are numerous:
contemporary moral judgment about the text’s best meaning for
now, respect for existing practices in the absence of a strong
justification for disruption, deference to the judgment of other
constitutional decision makers, and so on. Doubts about such time‐
insensitivity were raised above, but it is useful to rehearse the
arguments that might underwrite such firm opposition to the use of
originalism in decision‐making.
One complaint is not exactly a criticism. It has been argued
that sound historical inquiry reveals that past generations did not
accept certain originalist techniques, and therefore a genuine
originalist would have to follow that lead.127 This is a possible
125 Cf. James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the
Study of Judicial Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAV. 7, 9 (1983) (“In a nutshell, judges’ decisions are a
function of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to do, but
constrained by what they perceive is feasible to do.”).
126 On the issue of interpretive coordination across judges, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 121–24 & n.3 (2006)
(applying the fallacy of division).
127 The classic argument is H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 889, 894–902 (1985) (finding a form of common‐law reasoning
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consequence of originalist investigation, not a reason to avoid the
investigation. Nor is there an apparent reason within the logic of
originalism to short‐circuit this effort by assuming that the results
of these historical inquiries will be always determinate or always
identically liberating. This is especially true in light of the Article V
option for supreme lawmaking and the role for states therein.128 It
seems to require more convincing proof than is presently available
to settle the questions whether, for example, the original public
meaning of the Commerce Clause or the Coin Money Clause was as
“evolutionary” or “static” as the Speech Clause or the Equal
Protection Clause. Insofar as the history is ambiguous, one might
decide to fill the gap with an assumption of interpretive flexibility
over time. But this assumption would not be based on the history;
it would move along a path leading us out of originalism and toward
a range of objections to its unrestrained use.
At least one methodological attack on originalism is constant
across time. Some believe that strong originalism is — often or
always, conceptually or practically — impossible to perform.
Perhaps there just is no answer to the questions suggested by
original public meaning and other forms of originalism. The classic
exposition is Paul Brest’s.129 Part of his objection to originalism
rested on the difficulty of attributing any intent to multimember
lawmaking bodies,130 but his concerns ran further and he equally
questioned the usefulness of strong textualism as applied to new
circumstances. His description of textualism resembles original
public meaning originalism.131 Regardless, Brest’s point about
indeterminacy can be applied to versions of originalism that
disavow subjective intent. There need not be widespread or even
majority agreement on a given question of public meaning, at any
point in time.132 One might press this concern to the edge: Perhaps
with regard to texts). A response is Nelson, supra, note 118, at 523–39 (finding some
anticipation of invariant meaning and settlement by practice). Powell targeted original
intent originalism, not what later became known as original public meaning originalism.
128 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 278 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(remarking on Article V as the preferred mode for introducing “useful alterations . . .
suggested by experience”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (pointing
out state influence in the amendment process). This returns to the issue of how, if at all, to
distinguish “amendment” from “interpretation.” See Levinson, supra note 27, at 25–36; see
also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 67 (1986) (distinguishing “fit” from “the invention of
something new”).
129 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204 (1980).
130 See id. at 213–17.
131 See id. at 205–09 (discussing a text’s plain meaning to an ordinary English speaker,
and suggesting difficulty in understanding the linguistic and social context of dated legal
texts).
132 See Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of
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an accepted public meaning for any law is a phantom, a
mischaracterization of irreducibly contested understandings for all
legal texts. In the case of original public meaning, the observers
who are the target for the inquiry are mental constructs.133 At most,
according to this attack, there are rhetorical or political reasons for
acting as if originalism’s questions have answers.134 This objection
applies with equal force to W–old and W–new.
But for most, the radically skeptical position claims too much
territory. History might even be indispensable to interpretation
under certain conditions. Ancient text can lose all conventional
meaning with time, at which point it becomes difficult to see how
interpretation takes place absent historical investigation. May
anything sensible be done with the reference to “Letters of Marque
and Reprisal” in Article I, Section 8, without history?135 There also
are concerns with maximum skepticism for recently enacted text.
Here the concept of public meaning could at least preclude certain
understandings. Disagreement over meaning does not foreclose
operative conventions about the boundary of meaning, even if that
boundary is arbitrary in a moral sense.136 To accept radical
skepticism about originalist investigation, it seems, one must also
believe it impossible to understand the words of others when
delivered face‐to‐face in the here‐and‐now. This has a self‐refuting
quality.
With a belief that originalism is sometimes guiding, objections
to it become heavily dependent on time. Consider a milder
infeasibility argument: that substantial time lags make recovery of
old concepts both difficult and a creative enterprise.137 This could
Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 534–35 (2008) (arguing on this basis that originalism,
including original public meaning originalism, is “quite often” impossible).
133 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 119, at 398 (using an objective, intelligent, and fully‐
informed public audience as the touchstone for originalism); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note
115, at 1143–45 & n.113 (largely following Lawson).
134 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of IdentityBased Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2366–67 (2002)
(suggesting that originalism survives for “symbolic and strategic” reasons, not because it
constrains).
135 Apparently the last such letter issued in or near 1812. See FRITZ GROB, THE RELATIVITY
OF WAR AND PEACE: A STUDY IN LAW, HISTORY, AND POLITICS 237–39 (1949) (calling the Clause
“perfectly obsolete”). Grob distinguishes between letters of marque (commissions for
privateers) and letters of marque and reprisal (at one time referring to authorized self‐help
for individual injury suffered abroad, but later referring to armed trading vessels). He
reports that the United States commissioned privateers, but never armed trading vessels.
See id. at 239.
136 See Jack M. Balkin, Deconstruction’s Legal Career, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 734 (2005);
see also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951 (1995)
(discussing semiotic content that is socially attached to action in a given context).
137 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES 68–71 (2005) (critiquing the coherence, based
on time lags, of a “fundamentalist” originalism); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
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be acutely true for generalist judges, whose competence with
historical sources may be in doubt.138 Even if these dated meanings
could be accurately excavated, there is the question how an
understanding of a different historical episode should be applied to
the situation in t0.139 Given temporal distance, the answers might
be more challenging to provide with confidence, at a reasonable
level of effort, and without lapsing into indeterminacy. This is a
worry about originalism mostly limited to W–old.
Impracticality does not exhaust time‐oriented objections. If
originalism turns out to be accurate, cheap and determinate, a
package of normative arguments nonetheless might recommend
alternatives. First, a judge opposing the outcomes of ordinary
politics with original meaning could be intolerably undemocratic.
Depending on the operative theory of democracy, a just decision‐
maker easily could privilege the will of the living (however defined)
over the will of the dead (however defined).140 The positive law of
past generations is not necessarily representative of our
characteristics and judgment, particularly insofar as their
government was designed to include many fewer voices through
suffrage. The settlements they reached reflected a different
populace and a different politics. This presentism need not conflict
with a commitment to treating the document as valid law, either.
An intermediate position is that each generation should have liberty
to establish textual meaning according to contemporary
understandings or needs.141 And each generation unavoidably
chooses whether to respect this text as law; it has no practical force
otherwise.142
Second, critics test originalism for results on other fronts.143
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 802 (1983)
(suggesting that we can understand another era “[w]ith a great deal of imaginative effort”
but that “the understanding we achieve is not the unique, correct image of the framers’
world”).
138 See William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REV. 1237, 1250–51 (1986).
139 See Lessig, supra note 118, at 401–02, 442–43 (discussing meaning translation for the
purpose of preservation).
140 See THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 12 (E.P. Dutton & Co., 1951) (1791) (“[A]s
Government is for the living, and not for the dead, it is the living only that has any right in
it.”).
141 See William J. Brennan, Jr., Education and the Bill of Rights, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 219, 224
(1964).
142 See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1053 (1990)
(observing that law and culture fade without current effort).
143 See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 118
(2005) (arguing that “literalists” themselves ultimately rely on consequences); Cass R.
Sunstein, Of Snakes and Butterflies: A Reply, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2234, 2239 (2006) (arguing
that originalism must be justified by its consequences).
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Originalism might deliver undesirable consequences, depending on
one’s value set, and these adverse effects should grow more likely
and more severe over time. Originalism has been promoted as a
stabilizing force, and surely it is for a subset of cases. But in other
instances, the method is a tool for disrupting the status quo. At
least on occasion, strong originalism threatens new moral values
and judgments, existing practices and political bargains, common
decision methods and precedent within the courts. However
inevitable or desirable originalism might be for W–new, the argument
concludes, it is overly difficult or unwise for W–old.
Little effort is required to locate a reliance on time lags in
nearly all of these objections.
Whether the argument is
impracticality, disruption, democratic threats or other undesirable
consequences, the objections tend to be fueled by the passage of
time. This has two implications. The first involves the proper
emphasis of originalist argument. Those sympathetic to originalism
should prize normative justifications that can overcome the reality
of time lags in supreme law. This ties to a second implication.
Originalism’s critics might concede that strong originalism is
appropriate shortly after ratification.144 This concession is limited;
because the Article V amendment rate has been low, today’s
interpretation lags are typically long, and the courts lag behind
others in their efforts to understand the document. It is,
nevertheless, a meaningful thought that follows from a timing
orientation.
2.

Originalism in ratification’s wake

But in fact the objections to originalist decision‐making can be
advanced further, to reach W–new in some circumstances.
First of all, there little reason to believe that originalism is
inevitable here. Other approaches to reading text are available in
all time periods. The argument is perhaps cleanest for judicial
interpretation. While judges are hardly detached from the mores of
the political community in which they operate, neither are they a
representative sample of that community. There is no guarantee
that a judge’s view of the best moral reading of W–new, for example,
will be screened out from the interpretive process. Nor will any
such influence necessarily track a text’s public meaning as defined
by the hypothetical objective observer. Perhaps judges ought to
vigilantly guard against the impact of their ideological
144

See supra note 10 (collecting sources).
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commitments when adjudicating constitutional disputes; and
perhaps originalism is especially easy to perform close in time to
ratification.145 But this would demonstrate only that original public
meaning is less costly to execute at the point of ratification. It
would not eliminate alternatives.
Our review of cases ending short adjudication lags is a
reminder of originalism’s contingency. Perhaps none can be
confirmed as wholly originalist, while some have significant non‐ or
anti‐originalist themes. Recall the slave sale case of Osborn v.
Nicholson, which applied a natural law‐inspired clear statement rule
to a recent constitutional amendment.146 No resistance from forces
responsible for the Thirteenth Amendment seems to have disrupted
the Court’s preferences in this situation. Of course there is an
arguably special attribute to Osborn: The case rested closer to the
margins of the nation’s struggle over slavery than to its center. The
Court was helping distribute losses across commercial participants
in the slave market and perhaps influencing incentives to plan for
the possibility of legal transitions. One probably should expect that
judicial departure from any result suggested by originalism close to
ratification is most likely to occur when the issue is of secondary
importance to the text’s enthusiasts. In other situations, judges will
more often feel practically or morally constrained.
If judicial departures from originalism for W–new are possible,
perhaps they are defensible. This depends on the applicable
normative framework for the institution in action, but perhaps
there are persuasive visions for constitutional decision‐makers that
allow for anti‐originalist outcomes in ratification’s wake.
Consider the possibility that the Supreme Court is the best
place to vet moral principle over some sort of less enlightened
policy struggle,147 and that a formal amendment may come about
because of the latter. On this view, the Court can be a valuable
counterweight to Article V politics, which cannot be counted on to
safeguard these favored principles or engage in this form of
reasoning in every instance. Again, the objective public meaning of
an amendment need not coincide with a judge’s morally best
rendering of that text, and some might prefer the latter regardless
145 After all, a judge’s understanding of new text is something like a data point on which
public meaning can be established. Cf. Brest, supra note 10, at 208 (indicating that, near the
time of adoption, an interpreter “unconsciously places the provision in its linguistic and
social contexts”).
146 See supra text accompanying notes 77–80.
147 Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 34–35 (1996) (recognizing that the institutional
questions reduce to practical considerations and results); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of
Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 518 (1981) (defending a principle‐oriented role for the
Court, for at least some issues).
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of the timeframe.
A less philosophical twist on this position involves political
pacts. Constitutions and institutions may be seen as arrangements
of convenience in which elements of a political community are
allocated various roles of influence in order to make social progress
or avoid social disaster.148 On this view and to the extent judges
have the ability to influence policy outcomes, the Court might
represent either elite values or a countercyclical political force.149
Either way, nonoriginalist interpretation of new amendments could
further these pact‐oriented models for judicial behavior.
Our hypothetical judge is not obviously well‐suited or
sympathetic to these models. Readers might feel likewise. The
models might be too controversial, too optimistic, too cynical or too
often inoperable. Yet discarding them leaves another concern with
unswerving originalism for W–new: the problem of disruption.
Unlike the models for judicial behavior just discussed, the
disruption concern may arise in lockstep with post‐ratification
societal developments and without any independent judicial
resistance to any change indicated by a constitutional amendment.
It helps to remember that adjudication lags of some length are
largely unavoidable. Courts will rarely be the very first institution
to take a position on contested textual meaning in a system lacking
pre‐enactment advisory opinions. Others will be grappling with the
ramifications of new text before the judiciary offers an official
opinion on the matter.
Thus even an extremely short gap between ratification and
judicial interpretation opens the possibility for shifts in nonjudicial
arrangements and hardening forces that will interfere with any
judicial preference for originalist outcomes. To be sure, short time
lags make this situation less likely; not every amendment portends
swift and major change at odds with plausible renderings of original
public meaning. Yet time is only a proxy for serious change. An
inflexible rule imposing strong judicial originalism close to
ratification seems risky and unlikely. The early partisanship of
presidential electors is worth referencing here. Even a courageous
Court might have treated the argument for elector independence in
Ray v. Blair in the same way, and deferred to contemporary

148 See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, LIBERALISM, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 12–18,
87–98, 139–40 (1999) (characterizing successful constitutions as self‐enforcing
conventions); Barry R. Weingast, The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 89, 90–99 (2005) (considering constitutions as compacts among competing powers).
149 Cf. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1067 (2001) (describing federal judges as “temporally extended
representatives of particular parties”).
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practice, had the issue been litigated in 1796 instead of 1952.150 To
the extent judges cannot resist powerful sociopolitical change,
shifting away from strong originalism can be an institutional given.
In addition, there is the issue of indeterminacy in the wake of
ratification. Comprehensive and sophisticated originalist inquiries
will not recover decisive information in all litigated disputes
touching on new constitutional text. Decades do not have to pass
before unplanned developments or unconsidered applications of
new clauses are driven into the court system. Osborn is again a
useful illustration. Recall that the slave buyer argued that the
Thirteenth Amendment should immunize him from a lawsuit for
nonpayment.151 If they had considered the matter at the point of
ratification in 1865, trained professionals might have accurately
predicted how the Court would react to such an argument, and they
might have believed that such a foreseeable reaction was effectively
part of the Amendment’s meaning in the first place. But greater
imagination is needed to believe that any other objective observer
would have reached the same conclusions at the time of ratification.
Perhaps no understanding on the issue existed in 1865. In any
event, there will be occasions on which new constitutional text
generates questions that were not confronted or not resolved
during the ratification process and that an objective observer could
not confidently answer.152
Finally, strategic opportunities surrounding the compromise
trajectory are worth mentioning. If litigants know that judges will
turn to strong originalism soon after ratification but not thereafter,
then litigants might adjust the timing of their suits accordingly.
Those whose positions are strengthened by originalist sources will
prefer to litigate early, while others will prefer delay. This
possibility is moderated to the extent that parties cannot control
timing; we might view the federal judiciary’s standing doctrine and
opposition to advisory opinions as convenient limits on claimant
freedom over timing.153 Nor does a defendant in a justiciable suit
have a right to delay litigation for a generation. These constraints
on parties do not eliminate judicial power over timing, however.
Judges have used several devices to control timing, and surely
sometimes to increase the odds of their preferred outcome.154 But
See supra text accompanying notes 56–57, 82–83.
See Osborn v. Nicholson, 80 U.S. 654, 663–64 (1872) (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (agreeing
that slave contracts “were and are against sound morals and natural justice” and that their
positive law basis was eliminated by the Thirteenth Amendment).
152 In Part IV.D.2, infra, I will suggest that a less sophisticated originalism can elide part
of this indeterminacy problem, albeit at the expense of some typical originalist values.
153 See generally TRIBE, supra note 38, at 311–33 (reviewing justiciability norms).
154 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
150
151
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even if the compromise trajectory is predictable and the relevant
players have good reason to prefer one time over another, the
opportunity for gaming is bounded by our low formal amendment
rate. Most of the document is long past the age when skeptics
would concede the propriety of strong originalism.
Still, some critics probably have been too bashful. Originalism
is not predestined for new constitutional text, and the issues of
determinacy, disruption, and optimal judicial influence indicate that
originalism should not always begin strong. This is not to assert
that originalism is never an appropriate consideration in decision‐
making. It could be the presumptive methodology for an initial
period, or even be revived at later stages. But there is no time at
which strong judicial originalism is a priori inevitable or
desirable.155
IV. STRONG ORIGINALISM’S UNEASY DEFENSE

The above analysis builds a presumptive case against strong
originalism in judicial decision-making involving supreme law.
Standing alone, the foregoing suggests that judicial originalism not
only should expire but is occasionally stillborn. Our final task is to
marshal counterarguments. Some of them are standard points from
the originalism debate, and many of them are indeed diminished with
time or hindered by other weaknesses. This indicates the usefulness
of exploring more innovative arguments, which I will attempt in the
closing pages. But before moving to affirmative arguments for
originalist decision-making, there is a question of historiography to
be addressed.
A.

History Over Time

Incompetence is a persistent charge in debates over
155 Richard Primus’s recent article, which suggests a downward‐sloping trajectory for
originalism, makes that recommendation in part because the article’s scope is different from
the investigation here. Primus aims to show a limited set of situations in which originalism
is useful under two affirmative justifications for the method. See Primus, supra note 10, at
24 (calling these justifications “the best”). As for the relevance of time lags, he focuses on
democratic authority, see id. 2–5 & n.7, 46, and he agrees with a group of scholars who reach
the same conclusion on more limited analysis, see supra note 10 (collecting sources).
Primus’s discussion of rule‐of‐law values does observe that originalism can be destabilizing
when practice departs from originalist meaning, see Primus, supra note 10, at 51, but time is
not his theme, see id. at 5–7 (addressing justifications from judicial constraint without
stressing time).
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interpretive method. Some question our capacity to render a sound
account of the relatively distant past, a doubt that can be aimed at
originalists and historians more generally.
Perhaps the longer the temporal gap between an event and its
investigation, the less reliable an investigator’s perceptions are
likely to be. This decline in quality might not be perfectly linear.
But one might believe that a professional history of 1868 is more
likely to be excellent if written in 1888 or 1908 instead of 2008, to
the extent all other factors can be held constant. This decline might,
with time, cripple the case for originalism. Insofar as originalism
relies on excellence in historical inquiry to form a basis for
evaluating current practices, and insofar as this excellence moves
beyond anyone’s reach, let alone a judge’s reach, there is reason to
weaken originalism as a force in decision‐making.156 Ought implies
can, as they say.
There surely are trends that make sound professional history
less likely over time. Personal recollection of events softens and
then disappears as observers age and die off. They may record their
impressions, of course, but these recordings cannot be interrogated
as human beings. In effect, the authors of past impressions will
have restricted the scope of our questions. No one today may
canvass citizens about their understanding of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause in 1868, any more than Julius Caesar can be
asked what he said before crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C. In one
English translation of Plutarch, Caesar seems to have either
announced his acceptance of risk by declaring, “Let the die be cast,”
or indicated fatalism by the time he reached the river, announcing,
“The die is cast.”157 Or Caesar might have seen divine guidance in
the form of an omen, and then uttered, “The die is now cast”158 Or
he might have deliberated rationally for a time, until finally he
“closed the eyes of reason and put a veil between them and his
peril,” calling out, “Let the die be cast.”159 Or he might have uttered
nothing at all. There is uncertainty about what he said, what he
156 Compare Lawson, supra note 119, at 398 (hypothesizing “a fully informed public
audience, knowing all that there is to know about the Constitution and the surrounding
world” to help operationalize originalism), with Nelson, supra note 138, at 1250–51
(“[J]udges are not selected for office because they have special skill in reconstructing the
intentions of individuals in the past . . . .”). This concern is moderated by the possibility that
judicial appointment standards, applicant pools and sitting judges are responsive to the
interpretive demands of the office.
157 4 PLUTARCH’S LIVES 126, 291 (John Dryden & Arthur H. Clough trans., 1859). But cf. 5
PLUTARCH’S LIVES 272 (Bernadotte Perrin trans., 1914) [hereinafter PERRIN’S PLUTARCH]; 7 id.
at 522 (showing Plutarch using the same Greek words in two different Lives).
158 C. SUETONIUS TRANQUILLUS, THE LIVES OF THE TWELVE CAESARS 22 (Alexander Thomson &
T. Forester trans., 1896).
159 PERRIN’S PLUTARCH, supra note 157, at 273.
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meant, and what a later observer should understand the surviving
sources to prove. Similar difficulties may attend originalist inquiry
into legal meaning. This seems true whether the goal is to recover
actual patterns of language usage or to render the views of a
hypothetical informed reader of legal texts.
Nor will every pertinent record survive forever. Documentary
evidence can be destroyed and it will degrade on its own.160 These
eventualities are a motivation for statutes of limitations in litigation,
and there is a parallel basis for becoming less confident in anyone’s
ability to generate accurate insights from surviving historical
sources. Going forward, this concern might be allayed. Digital
formats could allow a greater proportion of evidence to reach the
future, and search engines should enhance the future’s ability to
locate what it deems relevant. But optimism about the quality of
2148’s history of 2008 will not improve 2008’s history of 1868.
A problem at least equally deep is recovering systems of
meaning. Understanding the context and manner of communication
within a centuries‐old era is a major challenge.161 No history will be
fully reliable without making this effort and without possessing the
skill to research and contextualize the events of what is in essence a
foreign nation. In this regard, critics of originalism and critics of
judicial reliance on foreign law have something in common.
That said, a different set of factors suggests another conclusion.
This is so even disregarding the virtues of second thought; surely
distant reflection on past events sometimes produces a more
accurate account, when the participants are no longer the
interpreters. Nor must the possibility of improving historical
knowledge solely depend on technological innovation. New
technologies are indeed allowing today’s historians to preserve
surviving records more effectively than before, to digitize and
search those records with more power, and to extract information
from artifacts in ways that could not have been imagined a few
decades ago.162 All of this is true, but the hope for improved
160 See, e.g., Nancy E. Gwinn, The Fragility of Paper: Can Our Historical Record Be Saved?,
PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1991, at 33, 35–47 (discussing “the brittle book problem” and the
cost of various preservation options); James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The
Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986) (evaluating negatively the
quality of surviving sources regarding drafting and ratification).
161 Accord Brest, supra note 10, at 208 (asserting that a textualist or originalist “must
immerse herself in their society”); see generally RAKOVE, supra note 117, at 20–21
(emphasizing connections between founding era constitutional decisions and broader
intellectual currents).
162 See, e.g., Ray A. Williamson & Jannell Warren‐Findley, Technology Transfer, Historic
Preservation, and Public Policy, PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1991, at 14, 17 (noting that
digitizing the L’Enfant Map of Washington, D.C., may show Thomas Jefferson’s influence by
revealing his pencil marginalia); Ann Longmore‐Etheridge, The Healthy Constitution of
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historical knowledge can be stiffened with other logic.
Allied with technological innovation is progress in
historiography. “Progress” is meant in a realistic sense. It refers to
the process of developing, vetting, discarding, resuscitating and
renovating professional methodologies for historical inquiry.163
The shifting perspective on Reconstruction among historians and
the multiplication of angles on those events, for instance, is a
development that many scholars would view as a stride forward.164
A few history department enthusiasts might go further and hold
that this process generates ever‐better approaches with time. This
optimism is, however, unnecessary to the argument. It might be
that historical methods are merely proliferating without improving
on average. But even if historians only expand the methodological
options without creating undue distraction, then we have a kind of
progress. Better or greater options will assist the intelligent
investigator who wants information from the past, assuming that
the options are not simply distractions. And a companion for this
methodological progress is the growing stock of prior attempts to
understand the events in question. Prior studies are the beginnings
of new studies.165
Finally, there is the contested issue of what counts as “good”
history. Self‐styled originalists are probably unsympathetic to
much relativism in historical inquiry; a goal originalists tend to
share is constraining the set of results that a judge can produce.166
But if we put aside the goals that originalists might have and
consider instead the usefulness of originalism as a method of
acquiring information, then relativity, subjectivity and even
postmodernism are oddly useful in responding to worries that
sound historical inquiry is slipping away. A message from the
postmodern perspective on professional history is that the
Document Security, SECURITY MGMT., Oct. 2003, at 26, 26 (describing high‐tech encasements
for the Constitution as a parchment).
163 See generally ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., BEYOND THE GREAT STORY: HISTORY AS TEXT AND
DISCOURSE xi (1995) (suggesting value in an eclectic mix of approaches, both modern and
postmodern); GEORG G. IGGERS, HISTORIOGRAPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: FROM SCIENTIFIC
OBJECTIVITY TO THE POSTMODERN CHALLENGE 1–19 (1997) (identifying major shifts in
historiography since an institutional professionalization of history in the 1800s, and
challenges to a correspondence theory of truth, intentionality and temporal sequence);
Pushpa Bhave, History: Old and New, in HISTORIOGRAPHY: PAST AND PRESENT 12, 12 (Kirit K.
Shah & Meherjyoti Sangle eds., 2005) (relating history to social construction).
164 A brief recounting of the trends is presented in ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863‐1877, at xix–xxv (Francis Parkman Prize ed., 2005), which
was an important effort to synthesize modern learning on the Era.
165 These observations might fit best for the single investigator. If many observers must
agree on how to characterize past events, multiplying the methodological options can
increase decision costs without guaranteeing offsetting benefits in improved accuracy.
166 See infra Part IV.C.
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interpreter matters as much or more than the target of
interpretation.167 This is a supposedly inescapable condition of
human observation. It is time‐invariant, holding equally true for the
historian in 1908 and the historian in 2008. If historians are in this
sense unavoidably presentist, there is no reason to prefer the old
vision of 1868 to the new vision. If anything, the postmodern
perspective would seem to default to the living’s vision of events
and not any past vision — which would be dependent on the living
for its survival and meaning, anyway. From this perspective, the
Constitution is forever young. It is a word string existing for use in
present‐moment decisions and its age is, in a sense, zero.
This might be pressing too hard. But one can see the lesson
without approaching the extremities of postmodern thought.
History is performed in different ways, for different purposes, and
according to different standards of excellence across time. There is
little reason to believe that our capacity to deliver what counts as
good history diminishes systematically as time passes, and some
reason to believe the opposite. Thinking that renderings of past
events are always permeated with subjectivity does nothing to alter
this conclusion. To the contrary, it seems to reinforce it. An
originalist who requires objective historical investigation has more
reason to worry, of course. Relativity is an enemy to that hope. And
originalists require a method for applying the lessons they learn
from the historical sources they select to the present‐day
controversies. An excellent understanding of meaning in the past
will not close all real cases. Even so, the concern that time is at war
with sound history seems weak enough for some form of
originalism to survive.
B.

Expiring Justifications

Our attention can now shift to affirmative justifications for
strong originalism. These justifications will be explored in a way
that highlights their ability or inability to withstand time lags. This
organization might be awkward. Originalists often emphasize the
need to control judicial inquiry, but the discussion does not begin
with these arguments. There is an upside, however. The central
challenge for originalism is to find a form and reason that are
convincing across time. The discussion below attends to this
priority.
167 See IGGERS, supra note 163, at 9–10 (quoting HAYDEN WHITE, The Historical Text as
Literary Artifact, in THE TROPICS OF DISCOURSE: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL CRITICISM 82 (1982).
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Two justifications for originalism do seem to expire over time.
Although less prevalent in academic circles today, social
contractarian arguments for originalism have been made.168 The
gist is that originalism of some kind is the best or only way to
preserve a previous agreement that deserves respect. One might
suppose that ratification under Article VII and subsequent Article V
amendments represent bargains, or pacts, or contracts, or some
other type of agreement to which the people of this country
assented, and that the substance of these agreements is best
characterized with originalist methods.
Dedication to such
agreements might be grounded in various normative theories,
including the sense that enforcing them respects individual
autonomy, even if this means that some third party will force
people in the present t0 to abide by old judgments from t–1. We
know that such precommitment can be beneficial when the
evaluation includes all time periods instead of only the present
moment, and that unconstrained freedom to choose at every time
period can be dangerous. This is the story for many drug addicts
and spendthrifts, anyway.169
But precommitment analogies are inapt.
One hitch is
vagueness. Sometimes historical inquiry will not illuminate the
answer to novel questions years later; sometimes the agreement is
no deeper than the document.170 But the problems run further. The
U.S. population is 100% different today than it was in 1789 when
the first version of the document was ratified. No one alive in 2008
witnessed any constitutional text‐making earlier than the
ratification of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments in 1913.
From the individual’s perspective, there is no same “self” who can
be bound by legal arrangements that he or she “chose” in t–1.171
True, today’s population might decide, explicitly or implicitly, that
adhering to the document is best. Public respect for the text is
indeed part of our legal culture. But that decision is not satisfying a
168 Cf. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 190, 191–92 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (arguing that “the guide in
expounding” the Constitution ought to be “the sense in which the Constitution was accepted
and ratified by the nation”). Madison later suggested that subsequent practice of the
legislature is crucial to understanding meaning. See Letter from James Madison to Charles J.
Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 184–86
(1865).
169 See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND 1–87 (2000) (identifying reasons for and methods of
precommitment for individuals); id. at 88–174 (applying and critiquing the precommitment
model for constitutions).
170 Cf. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 266–75 (1999) (emphasizing reasonable
disagreement and the downside of privileging past judgments).
171 See Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and
Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1757–61 (2003).
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precommitment, nor would it dictate originalist interpretation of
the document. The decision to treat the document as law and the
decision to interpret it by some method both require argument that
a precommitment model cannot provide.172 No matter how
convincing the model, it becomes vulnerable to additional
challenges with the passage of time.173
Similar reactions apply to a second justification. Many have
favorable impressions of those responsible for the document,
especially in its first edition. Perhaps the founders were uniquely
intelligent, knowledgeable and public spirited,174 and hence their
judgments should be trusted. In philosophical terms, they might
qualify as practical authorities:175 that the founders made a
judgment is itself a reason for acting in accord with that judgment.
Although the point is debatable, faith in those who made the text
might warrant a search for additional information regarding those
judgments. At a minimum, one could believe that the best way to
respect their superior judgment is to follow the textual meaning on
which those actors operated. If drafters and ratifiers are something
like practical authorities, then the argument for our deference to
them can be restated with the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT). It
demonstrates that the majority judgment of large groups can be
extraordinarily accurate — so long as the decision‐makers have an
average accuracy rate better than random, offer their independent
judgments and answer the same question.176 CJT might bolster the
172 An alternative is to move away from the living individual as the proper unit of moral
concern, and instead treat all generations who have lived in this country as a roughly
singular People. See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF‐
GOVERNMENT 145–54 (2001) (defining “a people” as persons who exist or existed “under the
rule of a particular political‐legal order”). Aside from the issue of how to define the class
and weight the preferences of each generation, the single‐People perspective is contested at
a more basic level. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 212–
13 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 381–91 (1997) (rejecting
an obligation to follow founding era preferences). Regardless, the choice is presentist.
Today’s decision‐makers are urged to adopt the single‐People perspective based on
argument.
173 Another version of consent need not weaken in this way. As mobility costs drop, it
becomes easier to think of residence as effective consent to the laws of the jurisdiction. But
this sorting dynamic is probably not robust enough to justify treating all U.S. residents as
having consented to the existing constitutional order. See Samaha, supra note 9, at 660. In
addition, it is difficult to see how strong originalism would follow from such consent.
Presumably consent would be to the constitutional system as it exists and not to a method
of interpretation not already or predictable in practice.
174 See, e.g., CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA x–xii (1966); Robert C.
Byrd, The Constitution in Peril, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 385, 387, 395 (1998).
175 See Scott J. Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK, supra note 114, at 382, 382–
85.
176 See WALDRON, supra note 170, at 134–135 & n.43 (providing a numerical example);
Bernard Grofman, Guillermo Owen & Scott L. Feld, Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth,
15 THEORY & DECISION 261, 273–74 (1983) (discussing opinion‐leader problems).
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credentials of past ratification decisions, without relying on the
questionable moral force of cross‐generational consent.
But here the time lag problem is altered, not eliminated. First,
we should wonder whether past generations of constitution‐makers
answered the questions we are asking. Even if they meant to
incorporate our interests and situation into their overall judgment,
presumably they were making judgments for all generations
together. Our position is different. Our judgments are for the
present and the future. Second, we must doubt their average
accuracy. Assuming that the relevant questions have right and
wrong answers, CJT only holds if decision‐makers from as long as
two centuries ago were on average more accurate than not about
the appropriate character of constitutional law in 2008. This is
possible, and it could be that many constitutional decisions are
unimportant anyway. But we can be sure that the founders were
imperfect.177 And, at the least, arguments from practical authority
and CJT become more vulnerable with time. As facts, values,
experience and judgments change there is often less reason to defer
to the decisions of past generations and more reason to depend on
judgments in t0 — which might themselves be designed to satisfy
CJT conditions.178
As with consent‐based justifications, there is room for
disagreement. The growing ignorance of the founders and
subsequent constitution‐makers might be preferable to the risks of
myopia, selfishness and strategic decision‐making in 2008. But the
understandable disagreement over whom to trust is related to the
passage of time. Time complicates the choice. So we still lack a
plausible justification for originalist decision‐making that is
insensitive to the text’s age.
C.

Persisting and Problematic Justifications

Other justifications for originalist inquiry are resilient to time.
They stand or fall regardless. The three explored here, however,
have other debilitating problems.
177 For example, it seems that they foresaw neither the need for an air force, see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–16; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (mentioning an army, a navy and militias), nor
the development of national political parties, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE
FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 5–6
(2005).
178 See generally Samaha, supra note 9, at 653–55; Adrian Vermeule, Common Law
Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1503–06 (2007)
(suggesting that the Constitution’s ratifiers compare favorably to contemporary judges but
without vouching for the reliability of either).
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First, consider the argument that originalism is handy for
constraining discretion when courts are playing the high‐stakes
game of supreme judicial review.179 This value need not diminish
over time. To the extent people today worry about judicial
discretion, an honest commitment to originalism might guide
judges away from their ideological preferences, and it might offer
everyone else a roughly objective standard by which to evaluate the
quality of judicial work. Others are comfortable with judicial
policymaking, considering the imperfections of alternative
institutions, or are not persuaded by assertions of constraint and
objectivity. As well, it is conceivable that historical events become
more opaque and less guiding with time. But suppose that judicial
policymaking is bad and that the assertions about originalism’s
constraining force are true.
The central problem is that originalism is not plainly superior
on the policy dimension of constraint. There is, after all, the
possibility of courts deferring almost utterly to other institutions
whenever constitutional claims are raised.180 That constraint is at
least as strong and objective. Other interpretive methods might
perform similarly. It is unclear why honest attention to reams of
judicial precedent is less constraining and less verifiable than
honest attention to historical understandings.181 Both call for
versions of analogical reasoning. Furthermore, judges already act
under a range of influences capable of dampening independent
judicial preferences, originalist and other. Even if we could set
aside the judicial selection process, which helps fashion the
ideological composition of the bench, as well as overt and credible
threats from other institutions, there is not much evidence from
which to predict that judges will maintain sustained opposition to
firm national policy preferences.182
It is unclear that any
179 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 117, at 7, 143–53 (demanding neutral principles for the
exercise of judicial review and arguing that original public meaning delivers them).
180 The “almost” refers to what has been called judicial inquiry into “existence
conditions.” See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions and
Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1114–15 (2003). It seems that judges must ask what
counts as ordinary law to do their job as expected, and this seems to call for constitutional
judgments that cannot be reallocated elsewhere without making a constitutional judgment.
See also Louis Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 444–65 (2004) (advancing ways in which the doctrine cannot avoid
constitutional law questions, or perhaps even political questions).
181 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
925–27 (1996); see also ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 156 n.31 (Hart
Pub. 2005) (1992) (noting that judges could objectively constrain themselves by flipping
coins).
182 See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 225 (1960) (estimating
that the Court had “seldom strayed very far from the mainstreams of American life”);
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 338
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recommendation on interpretation and decision‐making method
will bind down judicial behavior much more effectively than politics
and culture already do. Additional arguments are required to select
out originalism from alternative strategies for constraint.
A second time‐insensitive justification is, simply, originalism’s
results. This does not turn on “our” consent by past ratification, or
founder brilliance, or a uniquely constraining force in decision‐
making. Nor does it matter whether the date is 1808 or 2008.
Honestly performed originalism will generate a pattern of results in
concrete cases or, more modestly, will foreclose a set of results. The
pattern might be normatively alluring. Surely some originalists
have been attracted to historical inquiry in constitutional
adjudication because abortion rights appeared implausible on that
method, while gun rights and public religious displays did not.
Similarly for some nonoriginalists, with the normative intuitions
and methodological outcome reversed. With fundamental moral
commitments satisfied, one can bite the bullet and accept
displeasing results on secondary matters. In any event, it does
seem irresponsible to select interpretive methods without concern
for the foreseeable results. Sufficiently catastrophic outcomes
would, and should, dislodge any interpretive method or decision‐
making protocol.
The low ceiling on this justification for originalism is
nevertheless visible. It cannot move attention from the basal policy
questions, nor does it create leverage on the straightforward moral
issues for which people already possess analytical tools. However
essential or timeless, the results question is likely to be more
divisive and distracting than encouraging for originalism. It is a
component in the analysis rather than a solution to it.
If the counter‐impulse is to lurch away from results, consider
the argument that originalism is conceptually equal to
interpretation. The assertion is that interpretation simply is the
search for a text’s original public meaning. Insofar as a decision‐
maker is engaged in some other effort, she is not interpreting the
document.183 Time is plainly irrelevant to this assertion but the
stumbling blocks are equally apparent.
(1991) (“U.S. courts can almost never be effective producers of significant social reform.”);
Robert A. Dahl, DecisionMaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957) (finding that Court policy ultimately converges with the
positions of national governing coalitions).
183 See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1823–24
(1997) (seeking to segregate the concept of interpretation from the practice of
adjudication); Solum, supra note 117, at 3–6 (portraying original semantic meaning as a
factual matter, while recognizing that such facts do not themselves justify abiding by that
meaning).
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As a normative matter, the conceptual assertion is
unresponsive. If the assertion is meant as a definition for
interpretation, then it seems descriptive rather than normative. If
the assertion is meant as a superior understanding of what
interpretation entails, it is unclear what test is being suggested for
superiority. Suppose someone asserts that we should reserve the
word “interpretation,” not for original public meaning, but for the
recovery of authorial intent184 or for the various sources and
methods on which judges and lawyers typically rely when they
claim to be interpreting a legal text.185 What good test is there for
judging these competing conceptions? Convention is inadequate.
Not only does that standard move us back toward description,
common use does not restrict “interpretation” to originalism.
A different argument is that the written Constitution is a law,
and that judges have aset interpretive practice for law that should
apply equally well to this document.186 However convincing on its
own terms, this is not an argument from conceptual necessity. It is
a claim about the desirability of following “law” as defined in that
particular way rather than another. And if the argument proceeds
to the assertion that “law” simply is what originalism yields, then
we are back where we began: working with definitions without
clearly entering the normative debate. An originalism proponent
who points to conceptual truth must have something else in mind
— merely clarifying terms as a matter of throat‐clearing, or
stepping toward analogical reasoning across legal texts that will
operate on substantive principles not yet articulated, or perhaps
deploying a rhetorical strategy for capturing the term
“interpretation” or “law.” Otherwise the topic of justification is left
unaddressed.
D.

Innovative Justifications
1.

Ex ante incentives

There is another time‐insensitive justification for strong
originalism in constitutional decision‐making that might be more
184 See, e.g., Fish, supra note 114, at 1112, 1114; Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels,
Intention, Identity, and the Constitution: A Response to David Hoy, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS:
HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 187, 193–97 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992).
185 Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 128, at 65–68 (integrating the “best” justifications for a
practice into the concept of interpretation); Kent Greenawalt, supra note 114, at 268, 268–
70 (including text, original meaning, underlying rationale or basic values, application to
particular cases, and stare decisis).
186 Cf. BARNETT, supra note 117, at 100–07 (analogizing contracts).
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promising. It concerns incentives for political action, and it returns
to the dynamics of supreme‐law generation discussed in Part I.187
The claim would be that respecting the text gives value to a
venerable type of political mobilization and, to couple this goal with
originalism, that original public meaning best approximates the
political victories achieved through Article V or VII.188
This justification is aggressively forward‐looking. Today’s
decision to respect old Article V successes would be defended as an
instrument for inciting political mobilization in the future. It does
not require a special affinity for the founders, or a quirky
preference for delegating policy to the dead hand of the past, nor a
positive evaluation of originalism’s results in any particular case.
Instead the argument means to be process focused and ex ante
situated. Victory in the Article V arena would be rewarded with a
degree of insulation. Rolling back those victories would essentially
require yet another successful attempt to overcome the hurdles of
formal amendment. And the threat of “change” through litigation
might be reduced with a strong commitment to originalism in
judicial decision‐making. We should be clear that this move is not
quite right for encouraging ordinary politics in the present;
sometimes those outcomes will be sacrificed to drive home the
message of Article V’s value. The issue is whether this technique for
rewarding formal amendment would be and ought to be effective.
The logic should be familiar.189 Essentially the same arguments
have been made in law and economics when the question is why
testamentary instruments are respected in court.190 It remains
uncomfortable for modern lawyers to suppose that the dead
themselves possess legal rights or entitlements. But the living may
receive comfort from signs that the terms of a valid will are
generally followed if intelligible, and their property might have
greater value because of it. They might acquire more or waste less
of it. Perhaps the same rationale works for Article V lawmaking.
Translating incentive arguments into justifications for
originalism has attractive features, but also complications. Difficult
normative and empirical questions must be answered before the
The analysis below expands on Samaha, supra note 9, at 660–61.
Going forward, committing to enforcing original public meaning effectively defines
Article V victories as such. So the choice of interpretive method can be a transitional
question, rather than an entailment of the decision to encourage Article V lawmaking.
189 It does not seem prominent in the originalism literature. Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note
117, at 111–13 (viewing originalism as potentially pro‐democracy); id. at 207 (suggesting,
without empirical evidence, that judicial updating can make “[t]he asserted impossibility of
constitutional amendment . . . a self‐fulfilling prophecy”).
190 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 518–20 (6th ed. 2003)
(recommending efficiency constraints on testator preferences, however).
187
188
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incentives justification becomes persuasive. Neither uncertainty
nor indifference is enough. To incline toward strong judicial
originalism on this justification, one should be satisfied that the
Article V process is good enough to promote in light of feasible
alternatives and that a judicial commitment to originalism is the
effective and appropriate method of encouragement. Given the
present state of knowledge on Article V dynamics and the likelihood
of normative disagreement, there is reason for caution and
reflection.
To frame the analysis, assume that a category of sticky
supreme law is desirable but that the content of this category
should be revised episodically. Revisions might come in several
forms: adding supreme law or deleting some of it, entrenching
ordinary political victories or opening the way for them. The
optimal method, or combination of methods, for these revisions
turns on the desired rate of revision and the character of revisions
expected from each of the possible processes. This means that the
dynamics of Article V lawmaking must be understood given various
conditions, and then compared to alternative dynamics that are
equally well‐understood.
Putting it roughly, our current system of supreme law
comprises some number of Article V attempts and few successes,
along with some degree of judicial intervention that is itself
revisable through additional litigation or Article V. Other sources
might function as a supreme law, but accepting them as such would
be controversial and complicate the analysis. As for the judicial
contribution to supreme law, it can run on arguments similar in
substance to those made during an Article V effort. There is likely
to be overlap between, for example, arguments in support of sex
equality through formal amendment and through judicial
renderings of the Equal Protection Clause. Still, the arguments are
subject to different forces in different lawmaking institutions and
they will take different forms in court, which might influence
outcomes. We know that judges publicly deploy a range of analytic
approaches in constitutional cases — sometimes working with
precedent and principle,191 sometimes combining originalism with
other resources,192 occasionally presenting extensive originalist
histories.193
191 See, e.g., Davis v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 554 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2770–74 (2008)
(invalidating a rollback of campaign contribution limits for opponents of certain self‐
financing candidates); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665–70 (2004) (affirming a
preliminary injunction against the Child Online Protection Act).
192 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–40 (2001) (objecting to home thermal
imaging on grounds including precedent, workable doctrine and originalist principle).
193 See, e.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788–2812, 2816–

SAMAHA_EXPIRATION_SSRN (2).DOC

160

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

11/13/2008 3:29 PM

[Vol. 30:3

How would supreme lawmaking change if the judiciary shifted
to a strong form of originalism? As indicated in Part II.B, it appears
that no solid empirical study exists on the relationship between
judicial methods of interpretation and formal amendment rates. An
acceptable coding scheme for opinions needs to be worked out and
other variables must be adequately controlled. Until the work is
done and vetted, theory and speculation are the best available
resources.
One possibility is that a shift to strong originalism would not
have much effect on Article V effort, let alone success rates.
Remember that the practical choice is not between strong
originalism and no originalism, but between strong originalism and
today’s weak or episodic originalism. The smaller the magnitude of
interpretive change, the less significant any incentive is likely to be.
Nor is the proposal to subsidize Article V lawmaking. That process
is going to be very difficult to complete on most occasions
regardless of interpretive practices in the courts. Restricting the
judicial role in supreme lawmaking affects relative rather than
absolute costs.
Of course, we might not expect any Article V effort if the
judiciary predictably intervenes early and with total disregard for
the public meaning of what had been accomplished. If adjudication
lags are brief and court judgments are always respected, and if
courts then ignore Article V text and the general social meaning of
the text, those seeking change in supreme law might as well begin
with the courts. This picture of judicial behavior is, however,
incomplete. Adjudication lags are sometimes long, and the Supreme
Court often uses originalist tools when the lag is brief. To the extent
the Court dispenses with originalist argument, it might be on issues
where those arguments are unhelpful or on issues where
Amendment proponents are relatively indifferent.194
There is also the issue of the time horizon of supreme law
reformers. Recall the compromise trajectory for originalism, under
which the methodstrongly influences decision‐making close to
ratification and then flags over time. Whether or not this has been
the pattern in Court cases, it is an alternative to loyal originalism
and it might provide equally powerful incentives for Article V effort.
Much depends on the discount rate of potential law reformers. If
18, 2821–22 (2008) (invalidating the District’s ban on handgun possession in the home by
certain law‐abiding citizens for the purpose of self defense, although listing presumptively
valid regulation without similar historical research); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
42–43 (2004) (revising Confrontation Clause doctrine on originalist arguments, although
relying on precedent to note that the Clause is applicable via the Fourteenth Amendment to
a state trial).
194 See supra text accompanying notes 146 & 151 (discussing Osborn).
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their timeframe of concern is shorter than a century, for instance,
then strong originalism at t100 might be irrelevant. This is true even
on the friendly assumptions that strong originalism otherwise
makes Article V victories more attractive and that it provides
determinate answers on textual meaning. The issue of how courts
should behave in a post‐originalist period remains unresolved on
this analysis but, on the assumptions we have made, the resolution
of that question would not influence Article V incentives.
The foregoing is built on educated guesses. Others might have
different intuitions. And the issue is importantly comparative:
Given a static judicial system that is sufficiently awful, and
alternative lawmaking processes that are sufficiently good, it would
make sense to experiment with even longshot strategies to
minimize judicial influence. Extensive debate about the quality of
judicial decision‐making is ongoing, and there have been serious
attempts to compare the virtues and vices of different methods for
supreme lawmaking.195 In this space, only brief observations are
necessary.
The normative questions are unavoidable and controversial. In
comparing Article V, judicial adjudication, and any other process for
supreme lawmaking, one should have at least a general sense of
what counts as good or bad supreme law. This sense is hardly
uniform. For example, it might be that the Supreme Court exercises
its influence only on the margins of public policy,196 but that on
those margins it tends to favor elite values or countercyclical
political ideologies. In contrast, it might be that the institutions
involved in Article V lawmaking slant toward the interests of states
as states and congressional power centers. The content of supreme
195 See JOHN R. VILE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 6 (1994); Adrian
Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law, in THE LEAST
EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 229, 259–71
(Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (comparing common‐law constitutionalism
with formal amendment as a matter of theory on several dimensions of performance). For a
brief recap of potential dangers in Article V, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, What’s Wrong with
Constitutional Amendments?, in “GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS”: DEVELOPING
GUIDELINES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 39, 39–42 (Louis M. Seldman & Virginia E. Sloan eds.,
1999). On the threat to judicial power, see John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment
and Constitutionalism, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1958–60, 1968 (2003); Henry Paul Monaghan,
We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
121, 144, 174–76 (1996) (worrying about majoritarian forces). Other insight is provided by
Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the
Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 116 (1993) (worrying about
efficient policy outcomes in light of Congress’s ability to bottleneck Article V change);
William E. Forbath, The Politics of Constitutional Design: Obduracy and Amendability — A
Comment on Ferejohn and Sager, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1965, 1965–71 (2003) (questioning
whether constitutional obduracy via Article V is net beneficial).
196 See, e.g., KOMESAR, supra note 3, at 251.
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law generated by these options will differ, and the processes are
likely to reward different skills and behavior.
Evaluating those consequences depends on a theory of value.
Without making any clear mistakes in logical reasoning, an observer
might check his value set and conclude that it would be best if the
Court fully inherited the business of supreme lawmaking as a
counterweight to other forces in society; or instead Article V
lawmaking dominated Court influence in light of the sustained
political organizing ordinarily involved; or instead some other form
of higher lawmaking became exclusive, such as a popular vote
instigated by national petition drives; or instead the above
processes were combined in some way, perhaps just as they are
now; or instead the project of categorically supreme law were
abandoned. These evaluations are not irrational, depending on the
operative normative framework.
Adding issues regarding the appropriate rate of revision for
supreme law, and the appropriate degree of incentive for the
preferred lawmaking process, further illustrates the complexity of
the judgments involved. If strong originalism is effective at
channeling law reform efforts toward Article V, there is the
question of how strong the incentive ought to be. In the extreme
case, Article V would be the sole process for higher lawmaking to
the exclusion of (relatively) more case specific adjudication, and
formal amendments would arrive regularly. Some might consider
this outcome too destabilizing, or ultimately demeaning to the value
of the document as a national icon, or too sanguine about
entrenching value choices in text protected by Article V even with a
higher amendment rate. Others will be excited at the prospect of
supreme law migrating to supermajorities in Congress and the
states. Either way, one must have a sense of the proper level of
incentives. This is no easier than choosing the right length for a
patent term.197
Last, there is the related issue of implementation. A cost‐
effective strategy would be needed for enlisting and retaining
strong originalist judges of the right kind. We began the analysis by
bracketing questions of coordination within the judiciary by
considering the options for a single hypothetical judge. But at some
point, an incentives‐based argument will want to check the
achievable level of firm judicial originalism against the desired
strength of the incentive.
This effort to proliferate issues is not meant to be discouraging.
Choices must be made regardless of how complex the situation, and
197 See Louis Kaplow, The PatentAntitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1813, 1823–29 (1984) (identifying variables).
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incentives arguments have potential for some observers. With
certain empirical assumptions and normative commitments, an
incentive‐based justification for originalism might be attractive.
And this justification would minimize if not defeat time‐oriented
objections. The strong cautionary note, however, is that current
knowledge makes the necessary assumptions speculative and the
commitment to Article V debatable.
2.

The randomization analogy

Finally, there is a randomization analogy that might counsel
originalism in some form — or at least reconcile us to originalism’s
persistence. It is only an analogy. Originalism, in current practice
and according to its proponents, is hardly the equivalent of law by
lottery. Nor would anyone endorse randomization for all questions
raised by our constitutional text. Offering an equal probability of
victory to all comers would reward and attract arguments without
quality control. Yet, in hard cases, randomization has virtues that
originalism often aims to capture, while originalism might be
reworked to more closely approximate random selection. This
refashioned originalism will not expire with time, at least not
according to its internal logic. It could even gain strength with age.
The suggested relationship might sound unfriendly. If there is
any current association between originalism and randomization, it
is for purposes of criticism. A skeptic might assert that any alleged
public agreement about a word’s meaning is haphazardly
determined by a multiplicity of forces and the observer’s selective
reaction.198 More generally, randomization has a poor reputation in
law. Deliberately randomizing merits decisions has been a basis for
censuring judges,199 and it has a look of arbitrariness which might
contradict intuitions about rational decision‐making.200
At least in theory, however, deliberate randomization could
play a positive role in adjudication. It has been fruitfully used in
other decision situations, after all.
Law itself occasionally
incorporates a random element, sometimes to resolve high‐stakes
questions. Examples include military drafts, immigration visa
allocation, judicial case assignments, jury selection, land partition,
198 See Louis E. Wolcher, A Philosophical Investigation into Methods of Constitutional
Interpretation in the United States and the United Kingdom, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239, 266
(2006) (noting a critique of originalism along these lines).
199 See In re Brown, 662 N.W.2d 733, 740–43 (Mich. 2003) (censuring a judge for publicly
flipping a coin to resolve a short‐term child custody issue).
200 See NEIL DUXBURY, RANDOM JUSTICE: ON LOTTERIES AND LEGAL DECISION‐MAKING 87–88 &
n.6 (1999).
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and testing for the use or efficacy of drugs.201 These applications
suggest the advantages of harnessing chance in a subset of decision
situations. Putting aside the possibility of divination, modern
theory indicates entirely rational arguments for randomization.202
In its unweighted and statistical form, randomization offers
equal opportunity to receive a benefit or burden within a
predetermined pool of recipients. True, people often support
allocation by merit, market, need, effort, or equal shares by
partition or time before turning to the blindness of an unweighted
lottery.203 But the combination of equal chances and a hard‐line
rule can be attractive, at least as a last resort when reason cannot
identify one outcome superior to all others.
Thus rational choice theorists are open to randomization for
resolving persistent uncertainty, incommensurability, or
indeterminacy.204 When the correct norm is unclear or additional
relevant information is too costly to obtain, and when a decision
nonetheless ought to be made, a lottery can be the answer.
Egalitarian sentiment supplements the argument with a
background commitment to treating people equally.205
Randomization is one way to do that. Consider the allocation of a
scarce and indivisible benefit, such as space on an overcrowded
lifeboat. Here equal shares are unworkable, while equal chances
are possible and perhaps most acceptable to the passengers.
Moreover, pragmatists can find admirable features in
randomization. The rule‐like character of a lottery may be
comforting. A guarantee of equal probabilities aims to tie the hands
of decision‐makers who might be distrusted, cuts incentives to
curry favor with them, and is cheap to execute once the rule is in
201 See id. at 43–45 (collecting examples of social decision by lot); see also 8 U.S.C. §
1153(c) (2006) (regarding excess visas); Robertson v. Robertson, 484 S.E.2d 831, 835 (N.C.
App. 1997) (regarding partition assignments); HARRY M. MARKS, THE PROGRESS OF
EXPERIMENT: SCIENCE AND THERAPEUTIC REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900–1990, at 132–63
(1997) (regarding randomized clinical trials).
202 See DUXBURY, supra note 200, at 43–84 (collecting instances of and arguments for
randomized social decisions); Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication (2008)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author); see also Edna Ullmann‐Margalit & Sidney
Morgenbesser, Picking and Choosing, 44 SOC. RES. 757, 758–65, 769–70, 773–74 (1977)
(describing “picking” as opposed to “choosing” based on preferences and reasons). The idea
of “picking” interpretive rules is helpfully raised in VERMEULE, supra note 126, at 168–69,
179–80 (discussing interpretive canons and precedent).
203 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 41–44 (1978)
(critiquing lotteries and comparing them to other allocation rules). A weighted or stratified
lottery is a possible compromise between rewarding nothing and ranking everyone. See JON
ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY 113–14 (1989).
204 See ELSTER, supra note 204, at 38, 107–09 (noting that the decision costs of “fine‐
tuned screening” might be too expensive, leaving a residuum of uncertainty).
205 See BARBARA GOODWIN, JUSTICE BY LOTTERY 102–03 (1992) (exploring social lotteries as
devices to afford equal respect in situations of scarcity and structured inequality).
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place.206 Of course randomizing requires anterior decisions, such as
what to randomize and who to include in the pool. But aiming for
equal chances may be best when other options run out. Finally,
randomization is a foundation for experimentation. In fact, today’s
best empirical studies on causation often rely on random
assignment to treatment and control groups.207
Enough uncertainty surrounds constitutional design and
adjudication such that the theoretically optimal number of
occasions for randomization must be greater than zero. Despite our
experience and knowledge, we cannot with confidence conclude
that bicameralism is superior to unicameralism, or that presidential
systems outperform parliamentary systems, or perhaps even that
democracies yield faster economic growth than dictatorships.208
Even if everyone agreed on the values to be maximized, many
choices about the character of government would have little or no
impact beyond short‐term distributions, so far as we can tell, and
we might have difficulty ascertaining both the sign and magnitude
of any impact. Some of these choices will be posed in litigation.
Granted, no one thinks that all paths are equal in constitutional law.
But no one can realistically believe that all outcomes are
meaningfully different, and there is more than one way to select a
stable solution after the clearly inferior outcomes are weeded out.
Indeed, lot‐drawing is part of U.S. constitutional history.
Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution announced that “immediately
after [the senators] shall be assembled in Consequence of the first
Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three
Classes” with initial terms of three different lengths. When the
Senate first organized in 1789, its members sought to follow this
directive but the text seems unclear about how the three classes
should be composed. The senators began working the problem
with deliberation. They submitted the issue to a committee, which
suggested an initial principle: sorting the senators into three
See DUXBURY, supra note 200, at 51–56.
See, e.g., Gary Burtless, The Case for Randomized Field Trials in Economic and Policy
Research, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 63, 66–67 (1995) (explaining the advantages).
208 See, e.g., RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 151 (2004) (arguing that constitutionalization of rights in four
studied countries “has achieved little or no real change in arenas such as wealth
redistribution, minority political representation, and the equalization of life conditions”);
JAN‐ERIK LANE, CONSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL THEORY 208–10 (1996) (finding little connection
between economic outcomes and institutional design in OECD countries); ADAM PRZEWORSKI
ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL‐BEING IN THE WORLD,
1950‐1990, at 142, 166–67, 178–79 (2000) (finding that economic development is
generally not significantly influenced by the division between democratic and dictatorial
rule); Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 601, 624–29 (2006) (collecting
studies).
206
207
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geographically diverse groups with no two senators from the same
state in the same group.209 But this left the decision of which group
of senators to assign to each class. The senators could have
deliberated and negotiated on this issue as well. Instead the
committee offered another solution: randomization. One senator
from each group would draw a lot from a box and the fate of each
group would be determined accordingly. The initial allocation was
performed in this manner, and a modified version of the lottery has
been used upon the admission of new states into the union.210
Surviving records may not explain why the first Senate chose
randomization. But we can defend the lottery as assuring equal
chances when norms beyond geographic mixing were unclear,
sharing was not permitted, pool members enjoyed presumptively
equal status, and the discretion of fellow politicians might be
distrusted.211
Is it too much to expect the judiciary to act like the first Senate,
and on occasion combine deliberation with overt randomization?
Probably. Judges have self‐regulated against flipping coins on
merits decisions, constitutional or not. One might think this
position socially suboptimal.212 But courts face a public relations
problem with deliberately randomizing any judgments, and one
might worry that there is no easily articulated test for
randomization’s proper domain. In any event, we can assume that
literal randomization in the courts is foreclosed. The question is
whether originalist inquiry is ever a substitute for randomization —
a substitute that runs on similar arguments to meet similar goals.
To be sure, originalism as currently practiced is far from
randomization. Historical investigation requires human judgment
and it can be guided by its users to reach outcomes preferred on
other grounds.213 It was not shocking that two coalitions of justices
in 2008 described two incompatible lessons from history

209 See generally DANIEL WIRLS & STEPHEN WIRLS, THE INVENTION OF THE UNITED STATES
SENATE 163–64, 171 (2004).
210 See Floyd M. Riddick, The Classification of United States Senators, Sen. Doc.
No. 103, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 1–5 (1966). Some originalists might see the Senate’s
decision as an example of constitutional construction outside the courts, not interpretation.
To reiterate, my interest is in sound decision‐making, not interpretation standing alone.
211 Cf. DUXBURY, supra note 200, at 26–32 (presenting a short history of election by lot).
212 See Samaha, supra note 202 (exploring a restricted domain of merits randomization in
adjudication, and the influence of random case assignment on outcomes); cf. ELSTER, supra
note 203, at 37, 116–17, 121 (suggesting that people tend to cling to “the rituals of reason”
even when randomization is a suitable decision rule).
213 See, e.g., Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 113, 130–32 (2002) (finding that text‐ or intent‐based arguments in party
briefs generally do not predict justices’ voting behavior as well as proxies for judicial
ideology). It is not clear that any interpretive method ties the hands of its users very firmly.
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surrounding the Second Amendment.214 In addition, for at least
some time periods, the historical sources will not offer equal
probabilities for plausible outcomes. The history may skew toward
one of today’s ideological camps, and thus choosing originalism may
look like choosing the outcome. This is perhaps less likely for
certain structural issues, but a tilt might be supposed for issues
including firearms, religion, sex equality, and property rights.
Seeking answers from history is also controversial, if not self‐
destructive, in that it would systematically privilege ancient
judgments. Moreover, originalism can be costlywhen performed
conscientiously,215 and those resources tend not to foster
experiments. Originalism in a strong form joined with stare decisis
would inhibit further innovation. Nor can originalism guarantee
determinate answers to specific questions. Literal randomization
can.
Nevertheless, a version of originalism shares strengths with
the rational use of randomization in hard cases. Both aspire to a
kind of neutrality in decision‐making.216
Suppose that our
hypothetical judge is committed to abiding by the Constitution, but
its text is unclear with respect to the contemporary issue she faces,
and she screens out understandings plainly intolerable for us.
People will disagree about how any screening should be done, but
grant the wisdom of critics and accept that non‐originalist
considerations have been and should be used to reduce social costs.
Still the judge remains uncertain. We might be pleased if she then
consults historical sources linked to the text, even if we have no
confidence that originalist sources will suggest the all‐told best
outcome on this issue and even if we are not convinced that
conceptual necessity, precommitment, or incentive effects justify
history’s authority. Without any greater faith in originalism, it can
be a convenient and culturally acceptable tool for dispute resolution
when other options fail. If so, time lags might be unimportant.
History would serve as a tiebreaker regardless. Long lags might
even assist decision‐makers in achieving “arbitrary” results
neutralized from present‐moment ideology. Time has a way of
214 Compare Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008)
(indicating “no doubt” that the Second Amendment confers a limited individual right
unconnected with militia service), with id. at 2826 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that
“the Framers’ single‐minded focus . . . was on military uses of firearms”).
215 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 117, at 851–52, 856–57 (recommending originalism but
acknowledging the decision costs of high‐quality historical investigation).
216 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 116, at 17–18, 37–41 (supporting original public meaning
textualism with democratic and rule‐of‐law values against the creation of new law by
judicial preferences); Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 284–88 (1996) (similar).
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placing nonhistorians behind a veil of ignorance regarding the
past’s meaning, and of disconnecting current ideological cleavages
from older orders.217
The argument here is not terribly different from a rationale for
paying attention to the written Constitution itself: the focal point
theory of authority.218 For many disputes, settling them decisively
is more important than expending resources in a possibly futile
attempt to optimize the outcome. Referring to the document can
accomplish this. Every reader agrees that the document calls for
bicameralism, people tend to refer to the document to answer such
questions, they are already coordinated on bicameralism, and that
is good enough.
Neither the focal point theory nor the
randomization account of historical argument is bothered by
arbitrariness in resolving a class of constitutional questions. Both
gravitate toward salient solutions instead of answers that are
morally justifiable in another way.
There is a potential difference, however. The basic elements of
the focal point idea are that the document is already a salient
resource for limiting disagreement, that people are willing to accept
answers indicated by a “straightforward” reading of the text even if
they do not believe those answers are optimal, and that courts
should try to avoid disrupting this coordinating function of the
document.219 However, the theory indicates that the document
should become less important when the stakes are high and
disagreement is intense.220
The randomization model for
originalism need not conform to these boundaries. While cultural
support for historical references helps the technique get off the
ground, the importance, stakes, or disagreement surrounding an
issue does not rule out judicial use of history to settle disputes. Its
propriety begins with serious uncertainty rather than relative
unimportance. I would not want to decouple the randomization
217 One might wonder whether relying on a roughly fixed set of historical sources can
qualify, conceptually, as randomization or anything like it. But if we agree to draw from an
urn of blue and red balls to resolve a dispute, the process could still be considered
randomization if the balls were placed there 200 years ago. The same holds even if we
discover after the draw that 99% of the balls were in fact red. Accord ELSTER, supra note
204, at 43–46 (discussing a die loaded in an unknown fashion and distinguishing such
epistemic randomness from objective equiprobability); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G.
Sager, Just Lotteries, 27 SOC. SCI. INFO. 483, 487–88 (1988) (arguing that the equiprobability
event need not come after the decision‐maker chooses a lottery as the basis for allocation).
218 See Strauss, supra note 10, at 1732; id. at 1737 (adding that “[p]recedents can be focal;
original understandings can be focal”); see also Samaha, supra note 208, at 623–29
(stressing uncertainty as a motivator for using focal points).
219 See Strauss, supra note 10, at 1731–38, 1744 (explaining the idea and criticizing
originalism insofar as it prevents common‐law development of open‐ended provisions with
specific historical judgments).
220 See id. at 1743.
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analogy from the focal point model; indeed people who prioritize
agreement may randomize for the purpose of coordinating, akin to
what the first Senate did. But the two accounts do seem distinct.
Stripping history of greater pretensions, however, does
indicate that originalism should be kept simple. Professional
excellence is unnecessary if the goal is convenient and detached
dispute resolution in close cases, and originalism better tracks the
virtues of randomization if it is economical and unsophisticated.
Here there is no premium for objective historical truth or the
complete intellectual map of constitutional thought. To minimize
decision costs, it seems best for judges to rely on a relatively quick
first take on salient ratification era sources, followed by modest
additional research to confirm that their first impression is
plausible. This is not so far from the originalism sometimes
practiced in court. Contrast professional histories such as Jack
Rakove’s iconic Original Meanings, Eric Foner’s masterful
Reconstruction, and Gordon Wood’s triumph, The Creation of the
American Republic. These would not be the models; in fact, judges
might have to avoid reading them. Legal history that is “sloppy,
superficial, and sometimes inaccurate”221 would not be a major
concern, while the historian’s understandable “fondness for nuance,
understatement, texture, and even irony”222 would be a vice.
Furthermore, original public meaning need not be the exclusive
form of inquiry. Occasionally that question will be too abstract for
concrete decisions while drafting history, even if unreliable for
judging collective intentions or meaning, will do the trick.223
Consider one possible application of this version of originalism.
Part of the Twenty‐Fifth Amendment describes a dispute resolution
mechanism for use when the President is allegedly “unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office” and an Acting

221 DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED
QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 17 (2002) (criticizing Robert Bork); see also Martin
S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 524–
30 (1995) (criticizing many originalists for unprofessional histories).
222 Jack N. Rakove, Two Foxes in the Forest of History, 11 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 191, 195
(1999) (book review).
223 When presenting originalist argument, judges have not restricted themselves to an
especially narrow set of sources anyway. See, e.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. ___,
___, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2810–12 (2008) (relying on late nineteenth‐century sources to help
interpret a 1791 text); Boumediene v. Bush, 554 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2245–51
(2008) (relying on drafting history at the Philadelphia Convention and other sources to
ascertain the significance of habeas corpus at the founding); Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 43–50 (2004) (examining English, colonial, and state practice in an Eighth
Amendment case); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 729–30 (1986) (relying on drafting
history of the impeachment provisions); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 787–92 (1983)
(relying on practice from the First Congress onward).

SAMAHA_EXPIRATION_SSRN (2).DOC

170

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

11/13/2008 3:29 PM

[Vol. 30:3

President attempts to assume power.224 The process involves the
Vice President’s judgment plus majority votes of the principal
officers of executive departments “or of such other body as
Congress may by law provide.”225 If there were a power struggle
under these provisions, and if the courts were called on to say what
counts as “unable” or “other body” — suppose that the President
was kidnapped instead of mentally incapacitated, or that by statute
Congress had selected itself as the other body — few would be
shocked if originalist arguments were deployed. They might be
rightly outcome‐determinative. But this is not to concede that the
Amendment’s drafters or ratifiers had special insight in 1967 into
the finest dispute resolution mechanism for this occasion. Instead,
scraps of ratification history could point toward a defensible
solution that stops short of extensive judicial design choices or a flat
assessment of who among the contenders might make the better
president.226 The alternatives could be worse. It is difficult to
imagine a shared presidency or an auction for the office. In tight
spots, judges sometimes defer to another institution’s judgment, but
here there is no apparent location on which to unload the question
without making serious normative judgments first.
If the randomization analogy is too weak to endorse, it still
might help outsiders accept certain debatable Supreme Court
decisions. One might recharacterize several opinions as roughly
tolerable coin flips, regardless of how the justices experienced
them. For example, Court majorities might have failed to produce
professional history in recognizing state sovereign immunity in the
absence of consent to suit.227 But the outcome was consistent with
one interpretation of a digression in The Federalist,228 and the
possibility of state consent and its federal encouragement will limit
the doctrine’s impact. Or consider the Court’s decision to declare
invalid the legislative veto, forms of which had been inserted into
countless statutes.229 To some this is a blockbuster decision. It
must be difficult for an empiricist to agree. The case seems to have
had no provable lasting impact on policy or power.230 Empirical
224 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.
225 Id.
226 For one view of the congressional debate regarding other
THE TWENTY‐FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND

bodies, see JOHN D. FEERICK,
APPLICATIONS 206 (1992)
(indicating that Congress may attempt to select itself). On the concept of inability, see id. at
200–02 (indicating that kidnapping is included). I do not assert that Feerick’s findings
match a casual reading of the relevant history. That might be taken to impugn his work.
227 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68–69 (1996).
228 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487–88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
229 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958–59 (1983).
230 See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 225
(1988); Samaha, supra note 208, at 638; cf. Jessica Korn, Improving the Policymaking Process
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studies may explain cause and effect in constitutional design, yet
they also reveal critical areas of uncertainty. Add the presence of
reasonable normative disagreement plus the cultural support for
arguments from the nation’s past, and the case for originalist
randomization improves.231
As with literal randomization, however, the directions
suggested by history might be overwhelmed by other
considerations. Careful readers of The Federalist, for instance, are
bound to be startled on occasion. Today we ignore the idea that
cabinet secretaries should be able to keep their jobs after a new
President is inaugurated unless the Senate consents to their
removal.232 That arrangement is no longer viable even if Hamilton
interpreted the text correctly. In any event, an economical
originalism must be compared against alternative decision rules233
— everything from judicial discretion, to common‐law reasoning, to
normatively driven presumptions, to judicial abstinence. Judges
should be fairly certain that uncertainty surrounds the issue, not
just their own ignorance. Often judges have good reason to be
unsure about the normatively correct outcome but other officials
will be far better prepared to answer. These are not promising
cases for using history as a tiebreaker, except perhaps in situations
of extrajudicial stalemate. Further, an economical originalism
might be too unpredictable to use very often. Literal randomization
is even worse on this score, but economical originalism might be
less predictable than thorough historical investigation or current
judicial practice.234 Instability in judicial decision‐making might be
of less concern; ordinary rules of res judicata and stare decisis
would prevent serial destabilization. Yet judges would have to
understand which decisions were products of casual historicism to
prevent them from having broader subsequent impact. Finally,
ideological bias in history is still an issue. Perhaps its likelihood is
even greater for relatively superficial investigations when
by Protecting the Separation of Powers: Chadha & the Legislative Vetoes in Education
Statutes, 26 POLITY 677, 677–80, 687–96 (1994) (claiming, however, that Congress
stabilized certain funding decisions, took responsibility for them, and initiated negotiated
rulemaking).
231 Support for historical references in the general public can be in tension with the
randomization analogy, however. Judges who use history as nothing more than a
convenient tiebreaker are not obviously matching the culture’s hopes or expectations for
that information.
232 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
233 See Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann‐Margalit, SecondOrder Decisions, 110 ETHICS 5,
14 (1999) (comparing costs of various decision strategies at different stages).
234 See, e.g., Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, The
Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1152, 1163–79 (2004) (reporting
predictive accuracy of a statistical model and expert predictions for case outcomes).
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particular litigants and immediate consequences are in plain view.
While such bias can be monitored by comparing actual outcomes to
a random distribution, effective monitoring does not guarantee its
elimination.
Even so, impressionistic history has its place. Constitutional
arguments can be close and threaten to be endless, tolerable results
can be difficult to rank, split‐the‐difference compromises might not
be available, the text’s history might not match the litigants’
ideological cleavages, and a look at history is within judicial
competence. It is often consistent with public expectations.
Economical originalism can thus function like a random solution to
a problem that the decision‐maker is willing to accept as difficult.
This brand of historicism is not defended with the morality of
precommitment, or the conceptual necessities of law, or the belief
that fidelity to ancient choices yields correct answers, or the hope
that it will incentivize healthy democratic organizing. For those
who feel certain about the appropriate content for supreme law,
then, the approach will not be attractive. Many lawyers and judges
display this kind of certitude; they are often trained to do so. But
the reaction should be different for those who become convinced
that many constitutional choices are difficult, that some
consequences are hard to predict, and that human beings tend to
adapt around the decisions of courts regardless. For them, the
clipped use of history in adjudication will be, on occasion, the mark
of humility and impartiality rather than divination or fatalism when
the die is cast.
CONCLUSION
In its documentary form, our supreme law is aging. Even if it
were not, the judiciary would tend to arrive late in the process of
understanding it. These are facts of life in our constitutional
system. They should prompt the question whether the influence of
originalism on decision‐making should vary with distance from
ratification.
In response, I have presented a prima facie case for the
degrading influence of time on originalism’s strength in judicial
decision‐making, along with challenges to this compromise. In the
wake of ratification, originalism often will but should not always
dictate outcomes in constitutional adjudication. Like later periods,
that will depend on its determinacy, practical feasibility, destructive
impact and the chosen role for the judiciary. Long after ratification,
originalism probably should expire for many disputes. The passage

SAMAHA_EXPIRATION_SSRN (2).DOC

2008]

11/13/2008 3:29 PM

ORIGINALISM’S EXPIRATION DATE

173

of time makes a strong, broad, and sophisticated originalism much
less plausible.
However, the case for a fading originalism might be overcome
with one of two innovative arguments. A strong and lasting judicial
originalism might generate sufficiently beneficial ex ante incentives
for a particular type of political organizing, if one prefers that brand
of politics and if one is willing to make a set of empirical
assumptions in the face of uncertainty. Or instead the defense of
enduring originalist decision‐making might begin with an
admission that uncertainty will persist, that history sometimes
provides no better insight than randomization, and that something
like randomization can be a rational response to hard cases. These
justifications might be too weak or too narrow to satisfy
originalism’s typical proponents. But they do begin to confront
powerful arguments that will otherwise set an expiration date for
originalism.
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APPENDIX
CASES USED TO CALCULATE CITATION AND ADJUDICATION LAGS

Amendment

Citation Lag

Interpretation Lag

1st (1791)

84 years — see next column

84 years — United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875)
(holding
the
Petition
Clause
inapplicable to the states); sSee also
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 162 (1878) (upholding a
polygamy ban against a Free Exercise
Clause objection)

2nd (1791)

66 years — Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 417, 450
(1857) (opinion of Taney, C.J.)

84 years — United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875)
(holding that Second Amendment
rights against Congress did not permit
the Enforcement Act of 1870 to be
used against citizens who lynched
other citizens); see also United States
v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)
(interpreting the Second Amendment
to not cover sawed-off shotguns)

3rd (1791)

162 years — see next column

162 years — Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
644 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(raising the Third Amendment in a
discussion of the balance of authority
between the President and Congress);
see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (noting the Third
Amendment to help construct a
privacy principle)

4th (1791)

64 years* — Murray v. Hoboken
Land & Imp. Co., 59 U.S. 272,
285–86 (1855) (holding the
Fourth Amendment’s Warrant
Clause inapplicable to a creditors’
civil action)

42 years* — Livingston’s Lessee v.
Moore, 32 U.S. 469, 478–79, 482,
539, 551–52 (1833) (holding several
Bill of Rights arguments inapplicable
to the states, but without citing the
Fourth Amendment)

* The citation lag can be longer than the adjudication lag. Sometimes the Court resolves
a constitutional argument raised by a party without explicitly mentioning the Amendment
in question. However, this table relies on searches of text contained in the United States
Reports. Although the earlier volumes in this series describe attorney arguments, the series
as a whole will not identify every constitutional argument raised by a party and adjudicated
by the Court.

101
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5th (1791)

42 years* — Barron v. City of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250–51
(1833) (holding the Takings
Clause inapplicable to the states)

38 years* — Satterlee v. Matthewson,
27 U.S. 380, 406, 413–14 (1829)
(rejecting an attempt to build a vested
rights objection from multiple clauses,
but without citing the Fifth
Amendment)

6th (1791)

62 years — see next column

62 years — United States v. Dawson,
56 U.S. 467, 487–88 (1853) (holding
that the Sixth Amendment’s venue
provision did not apply to crimes
committed in “Indian country”)

7th (1791)

17 years — see next column

17 years — United States v. The
Betsey & Charlotte, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
443, 452 (1808) (permitting a libel
trial without jury over a Seventh
Amendment objection)

8th (1791)

42 years — Ex parte Watkins, 32
U.S. 568, 573–74 (1833) (denying
appellate jurisdiction to revise or
reverse a criminal sentence and
stating, in the alternative, that an
excessive fine under the Eighth
Amendment could not be shown on
the record)

75 years — Pervear v. Massachusetts,
72 U.S. 475, 479–80 (1866) (holding
the Eighth Amendment inapplicable to
the states and, in the alternative, that it
was not violated by imprisoning
defendant for selling liquor without a
license); see also Wilkerson v. Utah,
99 U.S. 130, 134–37 (1878)
(interpreting the Eighth Amendment as
no barrier to a judge ordering death by
public shooting for a first-degree
murder in Utah territory)

9th (1791)

145 years — see next column

145 years — Ashwander v. Tennessee
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 330–31,
338–40 (1936) (holding that the Ninth
Amendment did not withdraw power
from Congress to sell electricity from
a government dam)

10th (1791)

28 years — see next column

28 years — McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316, 406–07 (1819)
(upholding congressional authority to
charter a bank and contrasting the
Tenth Amendment with the Articles of
Confederation)

11th (1798)∗∗

0 years — see next column

0 years — Hollingsworth v. Virginia,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798)
(concluding
that
the
Eleventh
Amendment applied to pending cases)

∗ ∗ The Eleventh Amendment was proclaimed ratified by the President in January 1798,
see JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 20 (1987), and Hollingsworth followed shortly thereafter. The time lags
for this Amendment could be increased by using 1795 as the ratification date, which is
apparently when a sufficient number of states had acted to meet the Article V requirements.
See id.; see also Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368, 376–77 (1921) (indicating the Court’s belief
that amendments’ status as law does not depend on a proclamation from the Secretary of
State).
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12th (1804)

88 years — McPherson v. Blacker,
146 U.S. 1, 26 (1892)

148 years — Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S.
214, 224–25 & n.11, 228–30 (1952)
(interpreting the Twelfth Amendment
as no barrier to party pledges in elector
primaries)

13th (1865)

7 years — see next column

7 years — Osborn v. Nicholson, 80
U.S. 654, 662–63 (1872) (allowing
enforcement of a slave sale contract
that was formed before the Thirteenth
Amendment)

14th (1868)

1
year
—
Worthy
v.
Commissioners 76 U.S. 611, 613
(1869) (citing Section 1 of the
Fourteenth
Amendment
but
dismissing for want of a federal
question presented below)

5 years — Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. 36, 77–78 (1873) (interpreting the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as no
barrier to a state-created monopoly);
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 138–
39 (1873) (interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment as no barrier to excluding
women from the bar)

15th (1870)

1 year — White v. Hart, 80 U.S.
646, 648 (1871) (quoting a federal
statute that cited the Fifteenth
Amendment)

2 years — Slaughter-House Cases 83
U.S. 36, 71–72 (1872) (using the
Fifteenth Amendment to help confine
the purpose of the Thirteenth)

16th (1913)

3 years — see next column

3 years — Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 240 U.S. 1, 10–21 (1916)
(upholding a federal income tax as
within the scope of congressional
authority
under
the
Sixteenth
Amendment)

17th (1913)

8 years — see next column

8 years — Newberry v. United States,
256 U.S. 232, 249–53 (1921) (denying
congressional power to regulate
campaign
financing
in
Senate
primaries)

18th (1919)

1 year — Duhne v. New Jersey,
251 U.S. 311, 313 (1920) (denying
original jurisdiction over a
challenge to the Eighteenth
Amendment’s
validity
under
Article V)

1 year — Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253
U.S. 350, 385–88 (1920) (stating
answers to questions about the scope
of the Eighteenth Amendment)

19th (1920)

2 years — Leser v. Garnett, 258
U.S. 130, 135–37 (1922) (denying
challenges to the Nineteenth
Amendment’s
validity
under
Article V)

17 years — Breedlove v. Suttles, 302
U.S. 277, 283–84 (1937) (holding that
a state could encourage a white male
to pay a poll tax by refusing to allow
him to vote unless he paid, while at the
same time exempting women from the
tax altogether if they did not register to
vote)

20th (1933)

< still running >

< still running >
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21st (1933)

1 year — see next column

1 year — United States v. Chambers,
291 U.S. 217, 222–23 (1934)
(interpreting
the
Twenty-First
Amendment to prohibit pending
National Prohibition Act prosecutions
from going forward)

22nd (1951)

13 years — Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 370 (1964) (citing the
Twenty-Second Amendment in a
hypothetical)

22 years — Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 157–58 (1973) (using the
Twenty-Second Amendment as one
basis for excluding the unborn from
the term “person” in the Fourteenth
Amendment)

23rd (1961)

3 years — Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 555 n.28 (1964) (citing
the Twenty-Third Amendment for
a trend)

< still running >

24th (1964)

0 years — Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 555 n.28 (1964) (citing
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment for
a trend)

1 year — Harman v. Forssenius, 380
U.S. 528, 529, 538–40, 544 (1965)
(holding that a state could not demand
that a voter in a federal election either
pay a poll tax or file a certificate of
residence)

25th (1967)

7 years — Lubin v. Panish, 415
U.S. 709, 714 (1974) (citing the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment for a
trend, although this reference is
probably an error in the Court’s
opinion)

24 years — Freytag v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868,
886–87 (1991) (using a Twenty-Fifth
Amendment legislative report as
instructive regarding the Opinions
Clause and therefore the Appointments
Clause)

26th (1971)

1 year — Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169, 197 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); see also Lubin v.
Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 713 (1974)
(citing
the
Twenty-Sixth
Amendment in a discussion of
candidate filing fees)

8 years — United States v. Texas, 445
F. Supp. 1245, 1261–62 (D. Tex.
1978) (three-judge panel) (holding that
certain registration rules violated the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment rights of
college dorm residents), summarily
aff’d, Symm v. United States, 439 U.S.
1105 (1979)***∗

27th (1992)

< still running >

< still running >

Average:

35 years

42 years

Standard
Deviation:

44 years

47 years

∗ ∗ ∗ This represents a summary affirmance that was identified based on a dissenting
opinion.
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